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1. Introduction
High unemployment and unacceptable levels of social exclusion in Europe inspired the
European Commission to launch the Fourth Research Promotion Programme on Targeted
Socio-Economic Research. The research group Social Integration b~~ Transitional Labour
Markets, coordinated by the Social Science Research Centre in Berlin (WZB), is one of the
groups that try to make a contribution to a considerable reduction of the problems mentioned
above. The Department of Sociology of Tilburg University, The Netherlands, is one of the
participants in the research.
The research programme consists of four modules:
1. a module on Theory of Transitional Labour Markets;
2. a module on Households and Working Time Flexibility;
3. a module on Active Labour Market Policy;
4. a module on Training and Human Capital Investment.
With the exception of module four our department participates in all modules.
The present paper is meant to be a theoretical contribution to the modules two and three. The
outline is as follows.
We start with a brief statement of the central research problem. Then the key objectives of the
program will be sketched. In the next section we present an overview of labour market
theories which are currently used for the explanations of unemployment and which have
implications for the understanding of social exclusion. Discussion of the theories presented
will lead us to suggest an alternative approach. To that end we will first dwell on literature
about coordination regimes, conceived as institutions, and coordination mechanisms. In that
section we propose some connections between coordination regimes and ideologies as
expressions of basic value-patterns. Finally we present a more integrated socio-economic
approach, which can be used in the research programme Social Integration by Transitional
Labour Markets.
2. The central problem
The leading research problem can be formulated as follows: Which mixture of institutions in
the economic-political and social-cultural spheres can be expected to contribute to favourable
socio-economic performance, i.e. low unemployment and low exclusion, and which combina-
tions of coordination regimes will probably produce poor socio-economic performance, i.e.
high unemployment and high exclusion?
G. Schmid has proposed to tackle the problem in terms of what he calls a theory of transitio-
nal labour markets. It is his conviction that the relationships between institutions and social
exclusion~integration are mediated by labour markets: "The key hypothesis is that the borders
between the labour market and other social systems such as education and family life have to
become more open for transitory states between gainful employment and productive non-
market activities in order to alleviate present high structural unemployment, to prevent further
exclusion from the labour market and to reduce segmentation or occupational segregation of
the labour market." (Schmid 1996: 2)
Transitional labour markets are characterized by open borders with other social systems and
encourage mobility ( 'transitions') across these borders without inducing downward spirals of
social exclusion. They are supposed to optimize people's lifetime societal participation.
The concept is developed on the basis of a'modernized concept of full employment' defined
as "an average working time of 30 hours a week over a life cycle of both men and women".
Transitional employment are "called the phases in the life cycle in which the working time
deviates substantially from the new standard of 30 hours." Examples are spells of short time
work, training and retraining, temporary leaves. Transitional labour markets are "institutional
arrangements that allow such intermediate phases." (Schmid 1996: 4) The necessity of
mobility and flexibility together with the idea of 'work sharing', which is seen as expressing
cooperative attitudes, are the core ideas on which the theory is built'.
According to Schmid five types of transitional labour market can be distinguished: "transiti-
ons between short-time work or part-time work and full-time employment, or transitions
between dependent work and self-employment or a combination of both (1); transitions
' For a possible gloomier side on 'work sharing' see for instance Akerlof and Yellen. They mention
the possibility of "'work sharing' equilibria in which a larger number of workers receive less than fair
wages and work at less than full efficiency." (Akerlof and Yellen 1990: 274)
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between unemployment and employment (2); transitions between education or training and
employment (3); transitions between private (domestic work and employment (4); and
transitions from employment to retirement (5)." (Schmid 1996: 9)
His paper is largely devoted to an assessment of the different ways in which active labour
market policies could promote patterns of mobility that conform to the principles of producti-
vity enhancing flexibility and work-sharing. The possible contributions of public or political-
ly induced policies form a prominent part of Schmid's azgument.
In our paper we will try to broaden the scope of the approach. We will concentrate on
interdependencies between different societal spheres and the institutions that are part of them.
The goal is to explore the ways in which these interdependencies might influence the
transitional labour mazket processes and outcomes that Schmid has drawn our attention to.
3. The key objectives
The key objectives of our research aze:
1: the development of new theoretical and empirical knowledge about social exclusion and
social integration in Europe;
2: to strengthen the theoretical, empirical and methodological anchoring of the social
sciences in the countries of the European Union in the field of social exclusion and
integration;
3: to contribute to social integration policies, in dialogue with groups of key policymakers
and representatives of institutions that are actively involved in combatting social exclusi-
on and promoting social integration.
4. Theories of the labour market: promises and limits
~.1 Introduction
It is possible to distinguish three general conceptions of the labour market (H. Pfriem, 1979:
W. Bremer, 1991; A. Glebbeek, 1993):
A. the labour market as an exchange mazket;
B. the labour market as an arena;
C. the labour market as an institution, as an organization.
Each conception or paradigm has engendered a number of specific theories.
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4.2 Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as an exchange market
We distinguish four theories within the paradigm of the labour market as an exchange market.
The Labour Market as an Exchange Market
1. The neoclassical economic theory 'I
2. The search-theory: the result of relaxing the assumption of complete information i
typical of neoclassical theory
3. The human capital theory: the result of relaxing the assumption of homogeneity of
labour typical of neoclassical theory
4. The efficiency wage model: the assumptions of certainty and complete information
are relaxed; the assumption of risk-sharing adopted
Scheme 1: Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as exchange market
4.2.1 The neoclassical economic theory of the labour market
The central assumptions of neoclassical economic theory are:
1. Perfect competition:
1.1 Free wage determination: high supply and demand so that no single party is able to set
the wage rate;
1.2 Complete information;
1.3 Homogeneous labour resulting i:: perfect mobility
2. The objective of individuals is the maximization of economic utility (economic
rationality)
3. The labour market will reach equilibrium (because of the assumptions one and two):
- a wage level with equilibrium between demand and supply;
- differences in wages express different levels of productivity. (De Galan, 1981)
Theories 2 and 3 are derived after relaxing the assumptions of complete information and
homogeneity of labour, respectively (see scheme 1).
-1.2.2 The search theor-y
Compared with the neoclassical economic theory the assumption of complete information is
relaxed in the search theory. Relaxing this assumption produces a scientific problem, which
the search theory tries to solve. C. Holt (1971) is one of the relevant writers. Information is
limited in the labour market. Acquiring information is not costless, but it might help finding a
better job. Job hunting employees have either to accept a job with a given pay or they have to
continue looking for a higher paid job. They will go on looking for a job as long as the
subjectively (expected) extra pay exceeds the extra (expected) seazch costs. The best available
job will be accepted when the marginal benefits equal the mazginal costs.
In the search theory it is assumed that employees are looking for new or other jobs because of
the expectation of better paid jobs. Employers are also looking for employees. They keep
vacancies unfilled because they expect to find cheaper employees. In the search theory the
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assumptions of free competition, homogeneity of labour and maximization of econonuc
utility are maintained.
The macro level variant of the search theory is a labour turnover theory. This focusses on
flows and transitions ofjob seeking employees and vacancies.
-1.2.3 The human capital theory
The human capital relaxes the assumption that labour is homogeneous (Gary Becker, 1964)-
Investment in human capital is analyzed as a utility maximizing decision. Education and
training are the archetypes of this kind of investment. An higher educated employee is more
productive and will receive a higher income. Scheme 2 illustrates these connections.
Investment in Human Capital -~ Productivity --~ Income
Schenre 2: Causal relationships between human capital, productiviry and income.
Differences of human capital imply heterogeneity of labour.
-1.2.4 The efficiency wage model
The efficiency wage theory tries to explain wage rigidity in the case of excess-supply of
employees. Then the wages are above the market clearing rate. Why are the wages not
flexible? The theory seeks the explanation in a remarkable reversal of causality betwe~
income and productivity, as compared to neoclassical theory. The causal relationship, though
unchanged positive, is seen to run from income to productivity. Employers and employ~s
share risks. Employees adjust their productivity to the wage paid. The advantages of effici~r
cy vvages are:
- Forced dismissal is a real sanction;
- Turnover is restricted;
- Internal training becomes profitable;
- Their functioning as a motivating signal ;
- Efficiency wages enable employers to match persons and jobs. (A. Glebbeek, 1993)
Given their interests in the control of the labour process employers face strong incentives to
put the wage level above the market price. The resulting efficiency wages are a cause for
labour market segmentation.
A characteristic of the four theories within the paradigm of the labour market as an exchange
market is the emphasis on individualistic and economic rationality. The theories materialize
in equilibrium models.
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The most important policy recommendations resulting from the paradigm of the labour
market as an exchange market are:
- lower benefits than wages and abolition of minimum wages are expected to spur econo-
mic incentives
- free wage determination, flexible dismissal law and the abolition of collective agree-
ments;
- encouragement of education and training.
4.3 Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as an arena
4. 3.1 Introduction
Within the paradigm of the labour market as arena we distinguish three theories (see scheme
3).
The Labour Market as an Arena
1. The Neo-Marxist Conflict-theory, in particular the Theory ofthe Reserve Army
2. The Segmentation Theory
3. The Radical Labour Market Theory
Scheme 3: Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as an arena
The paradigm of the labour market as an arena contains three essential elements:
1. An important opposition between capital and labour, owners of the means of production
and non-owners.
2. Employees have no choice but to supply their labour capacity if they want to survive.
3. There is a distinction between labour capacity and labour performance. Labour capacity is
supplied, not labour performance. Via the labour contract the labour capacity is transfer-
red. The labour contract is a source of conflicts.
Employers strive after efficiency, low wages and wage-costs, and control of the labour
performances. There is a strong parallel between the opposition of interests in the labour
market and those in the labour process. Important themes are the influence of labour relations
on the labour market and on collective conflict and property.
4.3.2 The Neo-Mar-xist Theory of the Labour Reserve Army
In their attempts to control the labour process and to achieve efficiency, employers typically
engage in strategies of divide and rule. Wages are the outcomes of power processes. Employ-
ers' behaviour is mainly economizing. Technical innovations are designed and introduced in
order to reduce the volume and quality of employees. The internal market is kept as small as
possible.
Labour market processes can not be explained in terms of free market exchange. The superior
power position of the employers within the labour process determines the distribution of the
proceeds as well as of privileges.
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The capitalist labour process involves both a formal and a real subordination of labour, and it
is characterized by a sharp division of control and execution.
Ongoing rationalizations have two important results:
]. the constant degradation of functions and segmentation;
2. a structural labour reserve army.
The degradation of functions and the concomitant segmentation process produce a fall in
wages. The existence of the labour reserve army facilitates the disciplining of employees.
Unemployment is an inevitable result of rationalization. Inequality is a result of segmentation
into a privileged primary segment, a subordinate primary segment and a secondary segment
with sub-class.
According to some authors capitalist development passes through two phases:
1. a phase of economic growth characterized by capital widening investments which do not
lead to a significant increase in productivity as measured by the production function.
Wages and employment rates initially rise. As strong increases of wages erode the returns
to labour, the demand for labour decreases. Wages fall and the accumulation ratio
increases.
2. The second phase of accumulation of capital is linked to changes in production technolo-
gy which entail a relative decrease of employment. Aggregate demand does not rise, and
consequently the demand for labour decreases. The relatively more productive firms
attain higher market shares which aze reinforced by concentration processes, like mergers
etc.. (W. Semmler and J. Hoffmann, 1972)
-1.3.3 The Segmentation Theory
The starting point of the segmentation theory is the consumers' market (Altman and Bechle
(1971). Lutz and Sengenberger (1974), Sengenberger (1975), Mendius a.o. (1976)). Control
of the labour process and the achievement of a measure of autonomy from societal develop-
ments are important strategies in the pursuit of profit. The segmentation theory has two
variants: a more conjunctural variant, and a more structural one.
Conjunctural fluctuations in supply and demand of goods and services cause two processes:
1. temporary adaptation of supply of products and of production factors by measures that
stimulate performance and speed, flexibilization of the volume of employees as well as
time flexibility. Time flexibility can be increased by changes in labour time, overtime,
irregular work hours, easier hiring and firing practices.
2. stabilization of the mazketing of products by manipulation of delivery time and stocks.
These two processes lead to a dual labour market. The reactions to the conjunctural fluctuati-
ons result in segmentation which implies a reduction of mobility. There is a stable segment,
which is minimally necessary for survival during an economic downturn. In addition there is
a variable secondary segment that consists of employees with low qualifications, who are
cheap and easy to recruit. Developments in consuming markets also result in a dualization of
firms and sectors.
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Structural developments result in a segmentation of three markets:
- occupational markets. Here one finds a broad array of occupational education, knowledge
and skills. As the skills of employees are potentially useful for other firms as well, it is
not rewarding for individual firms to invest in human capital. Investments by the employ-
ees themselves in occupational skills can be rewarding.
- firm-internal markets. The qualifications are firm-specific. The firm provides on-the-job-
training. Allocation and reward occur according to institutional rules of entrance,
seniority, promotion and wage-systems.
- non specific open markets. General qualifications and low levels of required education are
the rule here. Without loss of production these qualifications are of potential use for all
sorts of firms. The employees are mobile. The principles of market exchange determine
the price and use of their skills.
4.3.4 The radical labour market theory
The radical labour market theory was originally formulated by the labour economists Reich,
Gordon and Edwards (1975). The production process, in which the use of labour capacity is
situated, constitutes the point of departure. The demand side of the labour market dominates
the production process. The behaviour in the external labour market reflects the processes of
production. The institutional rules governing the control of production, the social production
relationships and the conflicts of interests have to be examined. The principle of divide and
rule is widespread. The structure of the demand side determines the segmentation of the
labour market. Employers actively bring about segregation within the ranks of the employees.
Economic efficiency and control are objectives.
The following strategies of control can be distinguished:
1. Taylorism, formal rules and procedures, a bureaucratic control system, separation of
control and execution.
2. Internal markets with assessment of performance, wage and promotion systems based on
norms with respect to behaviour and performance.
3. Job requirements are embedded in educational qualifications which separate the primary
from the secondary segment; hierarchy and classification are dominant features.
4. A separation exists between core and peripheral firms, which is strongly associated with
dualism in working conditions and patterns of mobility.
5. Manipulation by employers also extends to the external market where employees are
played off against each other, on the basis of characteristics like sex, ethnicity and age.
The chances that employees organize themselves and even might oppose the employers
are minimized in this way.
Segmentation of the labour market is supportive of capítalist hegemony. The strategies
institutionalize labour discipline and social behaviour in the context of the control system.
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~.4 Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as institution
4. -1.1 Introduction
In this pazadigm the role of institutions moves to the forefront. We will discuss three theories.
The Labour Market as an Institution
1. The theory of non-competing groups.
2. The theory of the dual labour market.
3. The job-competition theory.
Scheme 4: Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as institution.
4. 4. 2 The theory of non-competing groups
Some labour economists and sociologists emphasize institutional and administrative rules (J.
Dunlop, 1958; L. Reynolds, 1951, 1956; J. Lulofs, 1960; W. van Voorden, 1975). The model
of open, free competition doesn't hold because of:
- the existence of non-competing groups;
- the existence of types of market such as monopoly;
- the use of collective power in wage-bargaining;
- relative autonomy of agreements, i.e. a limited impact of market processes.
In the case of non-competing groups wages are not determined by market forces, but by
power processes, institutions and customs, which were traditionally regarded as market
external factors. A division between the wage mazket and the job market is observed.
Collective agreements play a crucial role in the process of wage determination. This process
is highly institutionalized by collective bargaining and agreements. The allocation process is
also institutionalized by the operation of formal systems. Not only the allocation function of
the labour market is important, but the distribution function as well.
Kerr (1982) was one of the first scientists, who made a distinction between a closed and an
open segment. The closed segment is been structured in agreement with a set of rules and is
linked to specific firms and occupations. In the open segment mazket principles determine
wages and allocation. Kerr does not explain why this segmentation arises. The theory of the
dual labour mazket proposes some explanations.
,1. -í. 3 The theory ofdual labour market
Doeringer and Piore (1971) aze the fathers of the dual labour market. Reciprocal influences
between production structures and labour market structure form the starting point of the
theory. The fundamental distinction is between:
- the primary segment where the stable, better paid jobs offering career opportunities in
internal mazkets aze concentrated;
- the secondary segment with bad jobs and poor perspectives.
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An internal market is an administrative unit, within which, based on administrative rules and
procedures, the processes of wage determination and allocation take place. As consequences
of technological developments, the specific features of on-the-job-training and the develop-
ment of customs firm specific rules and procedures, come into being. In the secondary market
a vicious circle of exclusion and stigmatization evolves: prejudiced groups on the basis of
estimated productivity --~ no entrance to permanent jobs and internal education --~ insufficient
skills -~ unstable career -~ prejudiced groups.
4.4.4 The job competition model
L. Thurow introduced the job competition theory (L. Thurow, 1975; J. van Wezel, 1979).
Productivity is analysed as a characteristic ofjobs, not of employees. Wage competition gives
way to job competition. Equilibrium is not explained in terms of the price mechanism, but it
is seen as a consequence of (change in) selection standards. The concepts of relative educati-
on rank and schooling costs are important. Employers rank employees on the basis of
estimated education and training costs, indicated by basic chazacteristics such as education,
sex, ethnicity, age and experience. This process is called statistical discrimination. The
resulting queue is led by the persons with the lowest estimated training costs; employees with
high education costs close the ranks. When the number of jobs is lower than the number of
work seeking persons, the employees in the last positions are crowded out of the mazket.
Higher educated persons get jobs that used to be given to persons with intermediate levels of
education, etc. etc. The lowest educated persons become unemployed.
-1.~ Conclusion
In the present section we have presented a brief overview of ten theories of the labour market,
ordered into three paradigms. Though useful for man}~ purposes the theories do not add up to
a coherent picture of labour market processes. For several reasons this is a situation that
should be remedied:
- Most theories are general; this means that they include or imply empirical generalization
v~-hich, even in the case of clear empirical substantiation, do not even yield a remotely
comprehensive analysis of the labour market.
- Being not comprehensive the theories must be seen as theories of the middle range. The
question is then: what relations do these theories bear to one another?;
- With the exception of the neoclassical theory clear ideas about possible equilibria are
missing. We need a more balanced theory of the conditions of equilibria;
- With respect to methodological matters the theories show differences which should be
explicitly addressed and perhaps remedied: some theories emphasize individualistic and
micro level characteristics, whereas others concentrate on collective and macro level
characteristics; some theories emphasize processes related to utility and power, whereas
other theories point at mechanisms that aze expected to produce solidarity, trust and a
sense of justice. We need more clarity in these matters and perhaps some methodological
and theoretical bridges.
- The partial and provisional character of the theories is not sufficiently emphasized. This
means that the danger of committing the fallacy of misplaced concreteness is looming
which could be very harmful when policy recommendations are formulated.
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In order to improve the scientific relevance of labour mazket theory as well as its relevance
for the design of policies we propose to broaden the scope of the theory.
In the following sections we will present a more general and integrated conceptual frame-
work. Within this framework the more restricted theories, like for instance the ones we have
discussed, can play a valuable role.
We wish to emphasize that we regazd the framework to be presented as a formal model as
advocated by R. Boudon (1986, 1987). According to Boudon the search for social-scientific
laws is doomed to remain unsuccessful. The most we can achieve is to arrive at explanations
of concrete events, processes or relationships in terms of models, defined as "a deductive
system resting upon highly simplifying assumptions". (Boudon 1987: 55) A theoretical model~~.
does not as such admit empirical predictions. It is formal in the sense that it does not apply
to any real situation, but is rather a kind of framework that needs to be filled out once we
propose to use it to account for observations about the real world." (Boudon 1986: 202)
According to Boudon the 'filling out' can best be done with the help of the method of
decreasing abstraction. In our case this will involve, amongst other things, the empirical
interpretation and operationalization of abstract concepts, the specification of the institutional
context and the specification of actors and their mutual dependencies. Throughout the
process, the proper rules of parsimony have to observed (see below 6.3.1).
We will first examine some recent publications which deal with theoretical approaches to
coordination regimes and mechanisms. This literature might provide suggestions as to how to
elaborate a more complete theoretical framework that can hopefully be made fruitful for the
study of transitional labour markets.
5. Theoretical approaches to coordination regimes and mechanisms
~.1 Coordination regimes and mechanisms
Various models of coordination regimes and mechanisms have been described in the
literature. M. Havekes (1993), J. van Wezel (1992, 1994) and J. van Wezel and M. Havekes
(1995) have summarized these approaches. Some authors emphasize the institutional form of
coordination, other writers the coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms constitute the
link between structure and action. In the next scheme a typology of coordination regimes and
coordination mechanisms is given. Two dimensions are relevant: the dimension freedom
(first column) versus limiting controls (second column) and the dimension inequality (first
row) versus equality (second row).
Ouchi ( 1980) distinguishes between mazkets, bureaucracies and clans.
Williamson ( 1981) makes an distinction between a spot-mazket, an obligational market, a
relational team and a primitive team.
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Streeck and Schmitter (1991) have distinguished four coordination regimes and associated
coordination mechanisms: markets coordinated by competition, the state coordinated by
hierarchical control, community coordinated by spontaneous solidarity, and associations
coordinated by organized concertation.
Fiske (1991) focusses on process related coordination mechanisms. He distinguishes four
elementary types of interaction and claims that these form the basis for all human actions in
social relations: market pricing, authority ranking, equality matching and communal sharing.
Schmid (1992, 1993) stresses markets coordinated by prices, hierarchies coordinated by
power, networks coordinated by trust and civil rights coordinated by solidarity.
Thompson (1993) has used slightly different dimensions. He uses the dimension competitive~
cooperative instead of the inequality~equality dimension. The dimension freedorrircontrols is
replaced by independence vs. hierarchy.
In the analytical model of Parsons and Smelser the following structures are used: economy,
polity, societal community and social-cultural system. In the article 'Equality and Inequality
in Modern Society, or Social Stratification Revisited' Parsons (1977) used the dimensions
















3 association: organized concertation
4 : equality matching
5 net~~~ork: trust
6 network structure
7 social-cultural svstem: commitment
' 1 clan
II 2 relational team
3 community: spontaneous solidarity
4 :communal sharing
5 civil rights: solidarity
I 6 clan
7 societal communiri~: influence
Scheme 5: A rypology of coordination regimes and coordination mechanisms.
1. Ouchi (1980).
2. Williamson ( 1981).
3. Streeck and Schmitter (1991).
4. Fiske(]99]).
5. Schmid (1993, 1994).
6. Thompson (1993).
7. Parsons and Smelser (1956).
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Streeck and Schmitter establish a direct relation between the coordination regimes and the
coordination mechanisms.
Schmid refers to regulatory media: prices for the mazket, power for the bureaucracy, trust for
the network and solidazity for the civil rights.
It should be mentioned here that, following recent developments in labour economics,
Schmid analyzes trust and solidarity as playing an indispensable role in any conceivable
process of simultaneously optimizing the important societal goals of equality and efficiency
(productivity) (Schmid 1994).
Trust and solidarity enable effective and productive cooperation: considerations of incentive
and justice speak against excessive wage differentials" (Schmid 1994: 268): According to
Schmid the willingness of employees to apply their 'tacit knowledge' is crucial in a time in
which competition is strongly based on both process and product innovation. The capacity
and willingness of people to reciprocate is essential for Schmid. Institutional arrangements
which can be expected to enhance reciprocation should be promoted.
Schmid also argues for what he calls 'civil rights' institutions, defined as: "Institutions that
endow individuals with entitlements ... according to socially accepted standards of equality
and independent of individuals' capacity to reciprocate .... Their exchange medium is
solidarity ..." Civil rights, consisting for instance the expectation of "a fair replacement of ...
wage in case of unemployment", aze considered an important institution governing the
employment relationship. They provide and help maintain the incentive structure that is
indispensable to cooperation and productivity (Schmid 1994: 260). In a transitional labour
market they create the sense of security that is needed when people are adversely confronted
with the consequences of economic flexibility.
The four coordination regimes can be seen as ideal types, which hazdly ever appear in pure
form in the empirical reality. Each corresponds to one of the four mechanisms. It seems
highly probable that the empirical 'unpure' manifestations take the shape of mixtures of the
four types of regimes and mechanisms.
An interesting problem concerns the explanation of institutionally mixed types of coordina-
tion regimes. We think that this problem can be solved if one focusses in the first place on the
mechanisms involved. The azgument is that these mechanisms directly refer to behavioural
patterns which in general function as the source from which institutional forms, including
coordination regimes, originate.
The mixtures of coordination regimes consist of the various mechanisms, and can be
identified in terms of these mechanisms. Combinations of coordination mechanisms make
many more institutional forms possible. Different coordination regimes often exist side by
side. The processes that give rise to mixed coordination regimes can be interpreted as
'interactions' between the constituent regimes and mechanisms. The idea of interchange via
coordination mechanisms beween the four coordination regimes can be found in the societal
model of Pazsons and Smelser (1956).
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5.2 Coordination regimes and ideologies, basic valuepatterns
It is very interesting that the above-discussed dimensions also appear in research about
ideologies and values: freedort~controls and inequality~equality. This suggests possible links
between coordination regimes on the one hand and ideologies and basic value-patterns on the
other hand.
We can distinguish the following four value-patterns (Triandis 1994; Schwartz 1994; Jenssen
1995; see scheme 6).
Individualism Collectivism
(Freedom) (Limiting controls)
Authoritarianism Authoritarian Individualism Authoritarian Collectivism
(Inequality)
~ Egalitarianism Egalitarian Individualism Egalitarian Collectivism
~ (Equality)
Scheme 6: Four basic value patterns: four basic ideologies.
Jenssen summarizes the basic dimensions as follows: "Interpersonal values are beliefs about
what is desirable in the interaction between humans...Authoritarian values mean the acceptan-
ce of superiority and subordination as natural and desirable in human relations. Egalitarian
values mean regarding parity of power as desirable in human relations. Individualism
maintains that independence and self-reliance are natural and desirable. Collectivism stands
for the desirability of loyalty and mutual responsibility between human beings" (Jenssen,
1995: 56-57).
6. An integrated socio-economic model
6. I Introduction: our researchstrategy
Universities have a critical-intellectual task in society. The overview of theories about the
labour market and the literature about coordination regimes, mechanisms and basic value-
patterns leads us to the conclusion that a more integrated approach is necessary. It is also an
important objective of our research program to combine scientific relevance with relevance
for social policy. Our strategy will be to propose a broader theoretical approach to the
functioning of labour markets. This will hopefully enable a more complete insight into the
operation of labour markets. The subsequent application of the concept of transitional labour
markets should help us to establish under what conditions the values of efficiency, equality,
social justice, social security and optimal lifetime societal participation can be realized.
Finally, empirical reseazch will show to what extent the values that concern us here aze
actually realized.
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Our central value-laden research problem is:
Which institutions and which institutional mixtures promise to support a optimal mix
between efficiency and justice seen in a lifetime perspective? (cf. Schmid 1994: 259)
6.2: The optimal situation model and the perfect labour market
6.2.1: The optimal situation model
Our point of departure is the socio-economic equilibrium model that is proposed by Parsons
and Smelser (1956). This neo-functionalist model has more recently been further elaborated,
refined and extended (Munch, 1982, 1984, 1991; Van Wezel and Kuperus, 1990;
Van Wezel
and Havekes, 1995). It theoretically models a society in its optimal situation.
It is not
presumed that any empirical society strongly corresponds to this optimal situation. The
model
provides us with a perspective for the empirical study of society. It is a
cooperation or
communication model, not a harmony model. The model takes account of the
existence of
parties with opposing interests which, however, can be resolved, e.g. by
democratic consulta-
tion.
The starting point is a social system 'interpenetrating' with its environment. A system is able
to continue its existence in a changing environment only if the following conditions are
fulfilled.
1. The problems of 'adaptation to the environment', of 'the attainment of collective goals', of
'the integration of parts' and of 'the durability of long-term trends of pattern-maintenance
have to be solved. The four functions are: Adaptation, Goal-attainment, Integration and
Latency. Together they constitute the AGIL framework.
2. Specialized units and institutions, fulfilling these four functions, exist. These are:
the
Economy, the Polity, the Community and the Social-Cultural system.
3. Mutually dependent subsystems are related by exchanges of inputs and outputs
which
implies that they depend on each other for their continued existence. Differentiation and
specialization go together with integration. This integration takes the form of interpene-
tration.
At the level of society the four functions are fulfilled by the following specialized units:
- the function of adaptation by the Economy;
- the function of goal-attainment by the Polity;
- the function of integration by the Community;
- the function of pattern maintenance or latency by the Social-Cultural system.
We conceive these units as coordination regimes which are interlinked by media of inter-
change and exchange relations. Actors from different spheres of social life use these media of
interchange and enter into exchange relationships. It follows that the coordination regimes of
the economy, the polity, the community and of the social-cultural system interact with each
other. In the optimal situation we speak of 'interpenetration' of coordination regimes. The
respective coordination mechanisms associated with the coordination regimes distinguished
are: money, power, influence, and commitment. Six exchange relationships can be distinguis-
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hed in a society with the four subsystems or coordination regimes. We shall only consider the
three exchange relationships involving the economic system.
The exchange processes are mediated and governed by money, power, influence and
commitment. The central proposition of the optimal situation model is: "... under properly
defined conditions a system high in energy but low in information can be effectively
controlled by a system with the observed characteristics - that is low in energy but high in
information' (Parsons 1978: 375). This hypothetical situation can be compared with the
relationship between a horse and its rider. The horse is much stronger, has much more energy
than the rider. Nevertheless the rider can steer and control the horse bringing about a perfect
unity. Similarly, in the case of the optimal societal situation, the coordination regimes of the
Economy and the Polity are more energetic and flexible than the coordination regimes of the
Community and the Social-Cultural system. These last two regimes contain much more
social-cultural information. Under conditions of 'interpenetration' an optimal mix of energy
and information has been mustered. Such an institutional mixture of the four coordination
regimes represents a flourishing marriage between economic efficiency and social justice.
Social exclusion is absent.
It is possible to specify the exchange relationships with the economy in the case of'interpene-
tration' (see scheme 7). Arrows represent inputs from one system to another one. The letters
M, P, I and C designate the media of interchange Money, Power, Influence and Commitment.
The letters f and p are abbreviations of factor and product. A factor is pushed from the
sending system to the receiving system. A product is pulled by the receiving system.
The horizontal axis shows a money exchange of 'allocation of capital' (from the polity to the
economy) and 'control of productivity' (in the opposite direction). Here, we have to do with
decisions of monetary and political actors on the one hand and of economic actors on the
other hand. The money exchange is mediated by an exchange of power. In general horizontal
exchange relationships are seen to be means-creating. This also applies to the exchange
relationships beween the Econom}~ and the Polity. In this connection investments decisions
within the Economy are of primar}~ importance: they are pre-eminently means-creating. In the
optimal situation there is a favourable mixture of the coordination regimes of Economy and
Politv.
The diagonal relations are integrative. Organization and entrepreneurship are involved here.
The model indicates a money exchange of 'claims to scarce resources' (by the economy on the
community) for the 'ranking of budgets' (opposite direction). This money exchange is
mediated by exchange of influence, here taking the form of standards for the allocation of
resources and for the accountability of claims. In the optimal situation of the coordination
regimes of Economy and Community are favourably hanging together. The system of labor
relations is located on this diagonal axis.
The vertical exchange relations are regarded as goal achieving. Links are created between
production and sales. There is a money exchange of wage income and demand for goods and
services. This money exchange is mediated by an exchange of commitment to provide labour
on the part of employees and of a commitment to create employment among the employers.
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In the optimal situation there is a favourable mix of the coordination regimes of Economy and
the Social-Cultural System.
Recent research by Putnam (1993) has empirically and theoretically revindicated some
important insights formulated by classical authors as De Tocqueville and Weber. In his
analyses of contemporary Italy Putnam discovered that age-old differences in civic engage-
ment explain the persistent vaziations in 'political and economic performance' among the
Italian regions. Where voluntary associations thrive 'good government and 'good economy'
are observed and can also be causally explained from high levels of 'civic engagement'. In
other words a flourishing community helps engender the solidazity and trust, in the absence of
which organization and entrepreneurship can only suboptimally exist. Putnam stresses the
importance of dense, horizontal networks and the norms of reciprocity they generate













Allocation of capital, Mlp.
Control of productivity, Mlf
Opportunity for effectiveness, Plf.




Scheme 7-The optimal situation model (Van Wezel~Havekes,
1995, p. 44)
It should be mentioned that the analysis of Putnam strongly
concurs with Schmid's ideas
about equality and efficiency (Schmid 1994).
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6.2.2 The perfect labour market
The optimal societal situation implies a perfectly functioning labour market. The labour
market is seen as an interchange-zone between the economy and the social-cultural system.
The perfect labour market combines economic flexibility and rationality with security and
justice. Societal exclusion is minimal. Which are the conditions for the perfect labour market
to exist?
There is one boundary condition, and four direct conditions can be mentioned. The boundary
condition states the necessity of a good combination of human resources and technological
resources. Scheme 8 shows the several stages that can be distinguished in the development of
such a well-tuned combination. (Parsons and Smelser 1956: 139).
Phases Human Resources Technological Resources
One Primary Socialization Given data, information
Two Generalized Performance Capaciry Codified Empirical Knowledge
Three Trained Capacity Technological Know-How
Four Generalized Labour Power Generalized Purchasing Power
Fíve Labour Commitment to Firm Capital Funds Committed to Firm
Six Labour Assigned to Productive Functions Acquisition of Capital Goods
I Seven Utilization in Task Performance Utilization in Task Performance
Scheme 8: The fine-tuning process of human resources and technological resources.
To attain the stage of optimal fine-tuning the 'human capital developing institutions' (family,
educational system, firms; M. Brinton 1993) are crucial. Here we touch upon the topics of
module four of our research for the European Commission: Training and Human Capital
Investment. There must be open borders between the several phases in the process of human
capital formation. The institutional spheres involved also have to be characterized by open
borders to each other. The ideas of J. Dronkers and J. van Hoof about flexible interconnecti-
ons between education and labour (1980; 1986; 1990) tally with the stage-model of Parsons
and Smelser. The flexibility approach emphasizes three main phases in the process of human
capital formation:
1. primary socialization and general, non-occupational education;
2. interconnections between occupational education, apprentice systems, getting practical
experience, on-the job training, measures for re-training, updating courses;
3. internal training courses within firms.
The interconnections in stage 2 strengthen the capacity of supply and demand to adapt to
changes in the conditions of employment and the labour market. A good threefold system of
educational institutions is essential to prevent social exclusion.
We now come to a discussion of the four direct conditions for the perfect labour market
(Parsons and Smelser 1956: 114-123; J. van Wezel and M. Havekes 1995: 56-59). Before
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doing that two points should be emphasized: in the labour market the human factor has to be
motivated, and labour can not be dissociated from the person of the employee. In the
evaluations of employees considerations of justice play a role, not just those pertaining to
productívity. Physical factors merely have to maintained (Parsons and Smelser 1956: 134,
137). Therefore a perfect labour market is not only flexible, it also has to be experienced as
conforming to standards ofjustice.
The first function concerns the adaptation function of the labour contract. Here a balance
between the interests of the employer(s) and those of the employee(s) has to be struck. This
condition is very important in our research module 'Households and Working Time Flexibili-
ty'.
With respect to the organization of work we endorse the following analysis: "... on the
organization side ego's contract involves him in a set of adaptive relations to other units; this
is the organizational context of his role, which includes both the availability of non-social
facilities and co-operation of other role incumbents" (Parsons and Smelser 1956: 115). An
individual's ability to function in other social contexts should be preserved.
To give an example: in the perfect labour market the housewife does not function as a time-
buffer integrating the time-frameworks of labour, leisure, education, care for children etc..
which according to Elchardus' diagnosis of the time- buffer-function of the housewife has
been the case into the 1970's (Elchardus 1996: 29-32). This actual situation of the time-buffer
function of the housewife was a deviation from the perfect labour market. In the perfect
labour market employer-employee are such that women are not excluded from the labour
market. Though employers prefer flexibility of working time, they have to make optimal use
of human and technological capital; they have obligations to consumers, banks, sub-contrac-
tors etc..
With respect to the household situation the following analysis applies: "On the household
side, ego must be left a margin of freedom from organizational involvement to adapt to
certain household exigencies and secondary those of other roles. Conversely, household
demands must be adjusted to allow the fulfilment of occupational obligations. The problem is
to strike a balance. The regulation of the demand of time for work is obviously one of the
main mechanisms which facilitates this balance" (Parsons and Smelser 1956: 115). In this
connection the recommendations of Elchardus are valuable: a four day workweek in combi-
nation with longer firm-times; security in combination with flexibility amongst other things
to be achieved via cooperatives; the idea of a time-fund to stimulate transitions between
social security, education, work, care etc.; an explicit regional time-ordening policy (Elchar-
dus 1996: 78-95). The legal protection of labour regarding hours of work and hiring and
firing practices are also relevant here (Knegt a.o. (eds.) 1995: 53-107).
The second direct condition involves the goal-attainment of employers and employees: a
balance beween labour services, output and wages is needed. In general a power balance,
facilitating cooperation, between employers organizations and unions is necessary if this
condition is to be met. Collective agreements and their declaration of being generally binding
(Knegt a.o. (eds.) 1995: 11-51), institutions of income protection (Knegt a.o. (eds.) 1995:
19
I55-208) and minimum wage regulation can be conducive to the attainment of this second
condition.
The third condition is a balance in the integrative aspects of the employment contract. The
quality of working conditions and the quality of labour services then go hand in hand.
Employees show loyalty and responsibility, and employers provide good facilities, autonomy
and for instance relative security of (re)employment etc..
Here, institutions that optimize labour participation and the quality of work are necessary.
Again the significance of high levels of 'civic engagement' and its concomitants (horizontal
networks, strong norms of reciprocity etc.) have to be stressed.
The fourth condition is a balance of value pattern. Employees have to be motivated to do their
job that has to be experienced as attractive. Employers have to take care of an efficient
organization of work and productivity. Cultural institutions help to fulfil this condition.
6.3 Deviations from the optimal societal situation andfrom the perfect labour market
6.3.1 A provisional integrated socio-economic model: the optimal societal situation and its
deviations
It is possible to model three deviations from the optimal situation of interpenetration:
- inflation and deflation of inedia of interchange;
- the possibility of restrictions with respect to the realization of one or more of the functi-
ons that we distinguished: adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and pattern maintenan-
ce. We are especially interested in the functioning of the economy. Therefore we disting-
uish four restrictive states of the economy which we regard as models of the middle
range: the supply model (restrictions on adaptation), the demand model (restrictions on
goal-attainment), the organization model (restrictions on integration), and the model of
the greedy economy (restrictions on pattern maintenance).
- types of societal patterns or figurations each of which is a deviation from the optimal
societal situation of interpenetration.
The model of the optimal situation model and the deviations from the optimal situation, when
applied together, provide information not only about forms and processes of exclusion and
integration which are potentially possible, but for example also about any new form of social
exclusion which might have arisen compared to twenty years ago. Our theory might contribu-
te to a better understanding of the dynamics of social exclusion and integration and it might
help anticipate possible developments with respect to exclusion and integration in the coming
years.
We consider the interactions between economic, political, social and cultural factors that can
explain the dynamics of exclusion and integration.
A comparative analysis within an integrated approach of the interrelated role of institutions
and actors will provide a useful tool for the understanding and identification of different
causes of social exclusion:
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more structural and generally relevant causes;
more specific causes:
for a given social group
for a particular form of exclusion
for a given time and country
presenting broader European features.
The overall theme of our proposal is:
The building of a more comprehensive comparative institutional, inter-actor and interdis-
ciplinary model that can be usefully applied for the explanation of exclusion and unem-
ployment in Europe. The model should contribute to the design of a new model for the
development of the European Union, as mentioned in the 'Whitebook' of the European
Commission (1994: chapter 10, 175-181). The following sections will develop constituti-
ve parts of our model.
The explanatory scheme to be used
The explanatory scheme to be used can be laid out as follows. According to Mouzelis (1995)
a distinction can be made between the institutional structure and the figurational structure.
The institutional structure is a system of interrelated roles, positions and rules, which we can
break up into Economy, Polity, Community and Social-cultural system. The Agil-scheme,
elaborated into a model of the optimal situation and into models of deviations, gives us clues
as to the compatibility or incompatibility of institutions. We can characterize these instituti-
ons in terms of the dimensions of technology, control and ideology. If these dimensions are
incompatible, strategic behaviour and games between actors are important.
In order to characterize the . games it is important to take account of the positional and
the dispositional characteristic, of the actors. In addition, the features of the interaction-
situation are important. Finally, the hierarchical character of the games is important, together
with the fact that actors utilize economic, political, social and cultural capital.
Drawing on the dimensions of the institutions (technology, control and ideology) we will
relate to each other the institutional structure and the figurational structure, i.e. the system of
interrelated actors. It follows that it is not only the system of interrelated institutions of
economy, polity, community and social-cultural system that is important. The figuration of
interdependent actors, which influences the reproduction and change of institutions, is equally
important. The actual relations of co-operation andlor conflict between (collective) actors
affect the institutions in the next phase.
Following Boudon (1981: 97-98, 99-107, 109-123, 123-129) we distinguish three types of
institutional processes, two of which are processes of change. Boudon's explanatory scheme
depicts causal and feedback processes between the institutional context, the interaction
system and macro-outcomes (outputs).
The first type of process is called repetitive process. There is neither feedback from the
macro-output to the actions of the actors nor to the institutional context (see scheme 9). Here
we see a disjunction of structure and actions; repetitive processes do not cause any changes in
the existing coordination mechanisms, which we see as located in what Boudon calls the
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interaction system, and the institutional pattern of coordination. Actors reproduce the
institutions using current rules and coordination mechanisms.
The second type of process is a cumulative process (see scheme 10). There is a feedback from
the output to the actions of actors. The institutional context remains unchanged. Examples of
cumulative processes are inflationary and deflationary processes. The institutional context is
disjunct from both the interaction system and the output. This implies a disjunction of
coordination mechanisms and actions.
The third type of process is a transformation process. Here we see feedback from the output
to the institutional context. The institutional context changes. In this case there is a disjuncti-
on of actions and structure (see scheme 11).













. dispositional Scheme 11: Transjormarion process.
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Schemes 9 to 11: Three types ofinstitutional processes (Boudon, 1981, pp. 9i-98,
99-107, 109-123, 123-1 ~9)
This explanatory scheme amounts to a combination of (historical-)institutional analysis with
the investigation of interactions (or phenomena that can reasonably expected to be related to
interactions).
A very inspiring, recent example of its use can be found in M. Brinton (1993). She criticizes
some influential current theories (e.g. the human capital theory) for being "culturally quite
narrow." Her point of departure is: "The social-institutional context and the normative
patterns of human relations vary among industrial societies. These variations need to be -and
can be- theoretically formulated." Therefore, in order to analyse and explain the economic
role of women in postwar Japan she sets out to adjudicate "a balance between an explanation
... based on individual, voluntaristic action and one based on the institutional structures of
society..." (Brinton 1993: 17) In short, she argues for "a more cultural and social-institutional
approach..." (Brinton 1993: 78) that has to be comparative as well. In line with modern
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historical sociology, however, Brinton recommends, to restrict cross-societal comparisons to
a limited number of well-chosen cases.
In her research she conducted careful (historical-)institutional analyses of the 'human capital
developing institutions' (family, educational system, firms). In this way the institutional
context (the environment) was established. Guided by her knowledge of the institutional
context Brinton then went on to formulate hypotheses about the values, attitudes, preference
and actions of the relevant actors. Finally, a survey was conducted to test the hypotheses. This
survey yielded very interesting results to a large extent due to the culturally and institutional-
ly accurate information which had resulted from the (historical-)institutional analysis. Brinton
was also able to produce some interesting comparisons of Japan with the USA.
6.3.21nflation anddeflation of inedia of interchange
In the optimal situation there is neither inflation nor deflation of the media of interchange.
In
reality, the media of interchange -money, power, influence and commitment- are susceptible
to inflation or deflation.
Money is the capacity to buy goods and services. In the case of money inflation the purcha-
sing power of money decreases. In the case of money deflation the purchasing power
increases.
Power is the generalized symbolic capacity to make and make stick decisions on behalf of a
collectivity. Power inflation comes about when uncredible threats become frequent. The use
of power increases without a concomitant increase of binding decisions. It is only the very
powerful who make effective decisions. The effectivity of power peters out. The number of
political decisions does not decrease. Small groups yield power based on the threat of
violence.
Influence is the generalized capacity to shape attitudes or opinions by implicit or explicit
appeals to common group membership. Inflation of influence occurs when actors try to exert
influence without support in the community. In that case the will to arrive at compromises is
absent. Sharp divisions within the community arise. The use of influence increases but
solidarity does not. Deflation of influence can often be observed when influence has only a
narrow base, for example colour, ethnicity, age, sex or education.
Commitment is the capacity to specify values in order to make them applicable in particular
situations. Inflation of commitment is the will to implement too many values at the same
time. This leads to moralizing. Values tend to become deplete of ineaning. There is a lot of
discussion but straightforward measures are seldom. People lose their trust. Deflation of
commitment involves sticking to one's own values implying the incapacity to take into
account other values.
We expect that inflation of money generates the inflation of power, of influence and of
commitment. Thus we expect money inflation to concur with ineffective political power, with
divisions and exclusionary processes within the community and, finally, with value erosion.
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Processes of inflation can suddenly turn into deflation. Miinch (1991: 356-362) has suggested
propositions about the relationships between inflation, deflation and societal dynamics. We
can use these propositions to explain exclusion and to explain transitions between integration
and exclusion in both directions. Which are the key factors that influence the back and forth
between exclusion and re-integration? We have introduced the key factors of integration in
the model of the optimal societal situation. Following our diagnosis of the causes of exclusi-
on, we can hopefully formulate recommendations as to re-integration policies.
6.3.3. Theories of the middle range about deviations from the optimal societal situation
We propose four theories of the middle range which we respectively call: the supply model,
the demand model, the organization model and the model of the greedy economy. Their
common feature lies in the assumption of the absence of relevant restrictions in the optimal
situation.
In the optimal situation model there are no restrictions on supply. The supply side of the
economy is situated in the zone between the economy and the polity. It is the locus of the
supply of production factors, especially capital. Restrictions on supply cause a decrease of
investments.
In the optimal situation there are no restrictions on the demand side of the economy. In the
case of the demand model there are restrictions on the demand side. The demand side is part
of the interchange zone between the economy and the social-cultural system. Restrictions on
the demand side diminish the sales of goods and services as a consequence of a decrease in
demand for goods and services.
In the optimal situation model no restrictions on the organization side of the economy exist.
The organization side is placed in the interchange zone between economy and community.
The organization model refers to restrictions on the organization side of the economy.
Restrictions on the organization side hamper innovations in product-markets, in production
processes and tend to prevent new combinations of labour and capital.
Restrictions on the pattern maintenance of the long term economic culture are absent in the
optimal situation. The cultural aspect of the economy is crucial. The model of the greedy
economy depicts restrictions in respect of this aspect. These cultural restrictions within the
economy weaken the orientation on long-term productivity. Consumption tends to prevail
over production. In modern (institutional) economics situations like these are often analyzed
in terms of low trust, opportunism and myopia.
The supply model
The central focus of the supply side model aze situations in which factors operate that impede
investments. We aze mainly interested in the consequences of the supply model in terms of
social exclusion and integration.
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General questions to be answered include the following:
- Are the main characteristics of present forms of exclusion in the European Union
connected with the supply model?
- Are there structural supply conditions, producing social exclusion?
- Can we identify the social groups, which aze more vulnerable to social exclusion, because
of the actuality of the supply model?
- Do different social policies affect the role of unemployment as a cause of social exclusi-
on?
- Is the actuality of the supply model in particular connected with long term unemploy-
ment?
- Do changes in social welfare systems as expressed in new budgetary, fiscal and economic
policies contribute to the supply model winning ground?
- What is the role, if any, of changing mechanisms of regulation and deregulation?
In order to answer these and other questions compazative reseazch has to concentrate
on
cross-national and longitudinal analyses of laws, political intervention and the use
of
governmental power as they relate to exclusion, unemployment and integration.
An important theoretical question that has to addressed is which theories and models of
labour mazkets can be usefully employed in the examination of the supply model. In addition,
the possible use of other theories should also be considered.
The following list which we, by no means, do pretend to be exhaustive might be useful:
Schouten's model of 'monopoly-laborism' (Schouten, 1980)
Operating with an analytical framework in which economic society is seen to be swinging
back and forth between two disequilibria: monopoly-capitalism and monopoly-laborism.
Thev are characterized by power advantages of the employers and workers, respectively.
Under conditions of monopoly-laborism Schouten expects negative effects on the level of
investments, i.e. the actuality of the supply model.
The search theory
Untransparent labour markets resulting in high search costs can bring about the characteristics
associated with the supply model.
The human capital theory
Several human capital limitations might lead to reductions in the level of general investments.
One could think here of Williamson's (1985) analysis of the dangers of'hostaging2' applied to
employer-employee relations where insufficient 'sharing arrangements' have been realized
and one of the parties involved might be tempted to opportunist behaviour. The worker who
has invested in firm-specific human capital is the most immediate and clear example.
Situations like this might reduce desirable human capital investments and in that way
contribute to the sway ofthe supply model.
z In cases of hostaging one side to a contract pledges property in order to protect
the interest of the
other side (Eggertsson, 1990, p. 171).
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More in general attention should be directed at situations which elicit insufficient incentives
to human capital investments.
Eff ciency wage models
Efficiency wage models (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986) have initially been introduced to offer
explanations of involuntary unemployment. The first generation of these models referred to
employers' wage-setting decisions which are considered to be taken in the context of profit
maximizing investment strategies. Though it is true that Akerlof s rightly stressed the
combination of efficiency in production with exclusionary unemployment, from the point of
view of our broadened framework his analyses demonstrated mechanisms that are associated
with the supply model3.
High wage costs, high real wages, high collective expenditures, social regulation by the state
are indicators of the actuality of the supply model. The supply model functions as a cause of
social exclusion. The concrete causes in this case can especially be found in political
developments.
The process can be summarized as follows:
1. Suppose there are restrictions on the supply side.
2. These restrictions on the supply side have a negative influence on the decisions to invest.
3. Economic actors decide to invest less.
4. Lower investments cause lower production, lower sales and therefore lower demand for
employees.
5. Lower demand for employees influences the labour market as interchange zone between
the economy and the social-cultural system.
6. The outcome is an imperfection in the labour market caused by supply restrictions.
The demand model.
The demand model primarily addresses the consumer market. Questions regarding insuffi-
cient consumer demand constitute the core of the model.
General questions to be answered include the following:
- Which characteristics of current forms of exclusion in the European Union are connected
vvith the demand model?
- Are there structural demand conditions, producing social exclusion?
- Is it possible to identify the social groups, which are more relatively more vulnerable to
social exclusion because of the actuality ofthe demand model?
3 It should be pointed out that, in the aggregate, efficiency wages do not always cause unemployment
to increase. It has often been observed that efficiency wages tend to be most common in "industries
that are concentrated, have high profits, and have relatively small labor shares." (Krueger and
Summers, 1987, p. 40) So, the possibility has to be taken into account that modest losses in employ-
ment are offset by increases elsewhere.
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Are problems of effective consumer demand -to the extent that they lead to social
exclusion, unemployment and a lack of social integration- related to forms and extent of
part-time labour and further to practices of time-ordering and other processes within
households?
The role of new flexible time arrangements in reducing the social exclusion that is
associated with unemployment has to also to be investigated.
It will be worthwhile to relate processes and factors of social exclusion as they can be
found within family, health, education and value systems as well as in the distribution of
paid and unpaid labour within households to mechanisms associated with the demand
model.
These and other questions can be answered by cross-national and longitudinal studies of
values, lifestyles and private consumption, of opinions about the preferred set of societal
arrangements and, finally, of commitment to labour and employment insofar as these
phenomena can be seen to relate to exclusion, unemployment and integration.
Again, it is important to have a provisional list of theories and models of labour
markets as
well as of other relevant approaches which might cast light on the operation of the
demand
model.
The following list might be useful:
Keynesian and relatedtheories
It seems useful to use economic theories that are elaborated in order to
explain and analyze
situations characterized by aggregate demand gaps. Their implications
for the analysis of
insufficient consumer demand have to be pursued.
As related theories we mention the Marxist theory of the reserve
army and segmentation
theories. Marxist theories have of course generally been underconsumption
theories of some
sort. Segmentation theories also frequently have implications for
the level and distribution of
consumer demand.
Schouten's model of 'monopoly-capitalism' (Schouten, 1980)
In the disequilibrium situation that he refers to as
monopoly-capitalism it is the employers
who 'enjoy' power advantages over the workers.
Under conditions of monopoly-capitalism Schouten expects negative
effects on the level
of effective (consumer) demand, i.e. the actuality of the demand
model.
Ej~ciency wage models
As involuntary unemployment is one of the most important
direct effects in efficiency wage
models and the purchasing power of unemployed people is
relatively low, the relevance of
efficiency wage models for the study of the demand model is fairly
obvious.
It is clear that the actuality of the demand model can
be brought about in many ways. Some
indicators are large price-rises, (real) wage reductions, cuts
in benefits and excessive saving.
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The process can be summarized as follows:
1. Suppose restrictions on the demand side.
2. Consumers decide to spend less.
3. Producers react with a decrease of production because of a decrease of sales.
4. The decision to produce less leads to a lower demand of employees.
5. An imperfection of the labour market has come into being caused by restrictions on the
demand side.
A specific topic related to the demand model is the problem of the division of unpaid
housework and paid full-time or part-time labour between partners in households.
The labour mazket is an interchange zone beween the economy and the social cultural system.
An important condition for a perfect labour mazket has to with the balance which the parties
to the labour contract have to strike in their relations with other people (third parties).
As human beings with other roles, responsible for children, partners, members of voluntary
associations etc., employees seek to hold time sovereignty in order to fulfil these other roles.
Employers aze related to third parties like competitors, banks, subcontractors, many of them
having to take respond to the globalization of production and other changes in the internatio-
nal division of labour.
The labour market contract has to allow both partners to fulfil the requirements of the
relations with their respective third parties. Under certain conditions, part-time work can
favourably affect this balance. Equally important, in this context, are new training~education
schemes, the development of new service activities and the vulnerability associated with new
information and communication technologies.
The orRarlization model
The organization model refers to situations in which what might be called Schumpeterian
innovation ('new combinations') is inhibited. The model focusses, in particular, on lack of
innovation -of products, of processes, and in markets- due to the way the function of
entrepreneurship is performed.
In other words, the model is concerned with negative influences on entrepreneurship.
General questions to be answered include the following:
- Are the main characteristics of present forms of exclusion in the European Union
connected with the actuality of the organization model?
- Are there structural organization conditions, producing social exclusion?
- Is it possible to identify the social groups, which, because of actuality of the organization
model, are relatively vulnerable to social exclusion?
The vulnerability of the low qualified segment of the labour force is of crucial importance
here.
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- Comparative analysis of recent changes in labour relations and in labour mazket regulati-
on and social policies has to answer the question whether and, if this is the case, to what
extent these developments must be seen as causes of unemployment and of the deteriora-
tion of the conditions of the unemployed.
- With respect to the voluntary sector the question will be asked whether, how and to what
extent 'civic networks', 'civic engagement' (Putnam) and 'civil rights' (Schmid), encourage
organization and entrepreneurship. This question necessitates an analysis of the role of
solidarity.
- It will be asked whether the modalities of the formation of inter-ethnic relations influence
exclusion, unemployment and integration.
Compazative case studies of the real life conditions, the experiences and views of the
social groups concerned will be of great value, especially if they are conducted in
combination with cross-national and longitudinal studies.
Cross-national, longitudinal and case studies will be needed in order to answer the
questions
listed above. They have to concentrate on the investigation of the interactions of social norms,
solidarity and labour relations as they beaz upon processes of exclusion, unemployment
and
integration.
A variety of theories and models of labour mazkets together with some other
theories
promises to be helpful in the analysis of the organization model.
The following list might be useful:
Schumpeterian theories about innovating entrepreneurship
As Schumpeter is rightly considered the pioneering author when it comes to the analysis of
business innovation it seems obvious to consult his work and that of his followers in this area
(Swedberg. 1991). It is to be expected that the distinction between 'entrepreneurs' and
'rentiers' can be usefully employed.
Theories stressing infrastructuralservices
The function of entrepeneuring is dependent on the quantity and quality of the materials to be
combined. Of the many relevant factors it suffices here to mention transport facilities,
education, property rights and fiscal arrangement.
The theory can be drawn from a variety of literatures. We think of modern historical
sociology and modern historical economics and the developments in modern institutional
economics and rational-choice sociology (Groenewegen et al., 1995, Kerstholt, 1994)
Theories about comparative labour relations
The rich literature in this field hazdly needs mentioning. We regazd the theories about the
labour mazket as an institution as an integral part of this literature.
We, however, like to stress that apart from the conditions under which cooperative and
productive relations develop, special attention has to be paid to the problem of the compensa-
tion of the inevitable 'losers' in innovation processes.
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The human capital theory
The human capital theory is relevant for the same reasons as theories about infrastructural
services are listed above.
Indeed, the quantities and qualities of investment in human capital are essential to the
process of making new combinations.
Ej~ciency wage models
Efficiency wage models are relevant here. But one should keep in mind that efficiency wages
have exclusionary effects. This means that innovation and exclusion may coincide. The
conditions under which this occurs deserve cazeful study, together of course with the
conditions that help avoid this combination. Some interesting interactions of notions of a'fair
wage' and solidarity producing or not producing relations between employers and different
categories of workers seem to be involved (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).
The job-competition theory
The job-competition model envisages situations that combine innovations by entrepeneurs
with routinely performed exclusionary practíces.
If the organization model is actual, the execution of entrepreneurship is inhibited which
causes a lack of innovation in the economy and a concomitant lack of inclusion of new labour
supply. Members of minority groups, young entrants and women aze the main victims.
Exclusion increases and solidarity decreases. A division within the labour market between
insiders and outsiders arises. In this case social developments cause exclusion.
Organization restrictions can have several causes:
- the existence of non-representative advisory bodies operating in the field of economic
policy;
- an unbalanced profit rate;
- the absence of community level measures regulating allocation and distribution, aimed at
giving direction to the economy. There are several possibilities here: a lack of general
accepted goals of social-economic policy; the existence of free wage policy for the market
sector in the absence of central agreements; the absence of a link between wages and
benefits; too much or too little differentiation of wages; a lack of consensus about labour
time; in general insufficient institutional arrangements beween government and social
partners.
Restrictions on the organizatíon side cause a lack of innovation. The process can be summari-
zed as follows:
1. There are restrictions on the organization side.
2. The actors of the community, especially employer and employee organizations, do not
provide standards for the allocation and distribution of scazce resources and for the
organization and combination of labour and capital.
3. The reaction of the economic actors results in a lack of innovation in the economy. The
prevailing situation is maintained and there aze limits to entrepreneurship. There is no
synthesis of economic and social considerations.
4. Because of the lack of innovation there are few new jobs and few new enterprises.
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5. The growth of new jobs stagnates and the employers decide to demand less new employ-
ees.
6. The conclusion is that there is an imperfection in the labour market resulting from
organizational restrictions.
The model of the greedy economy
This model centres on cultural features that block the development of the levels of trust and
foresight without which a society can not function well. Under the conditions of a greedy
economy short-term interests dominate the choices managers, workers and consumers make,
and 'gainful' transactions do not take place. The balance between present as well as future
consumption and production is upset.
General questions to be answered include the following:
- Do the main chazacteristics of present forms of exclusion in the European Union beaz any
relation to the model of the greedy economy?
- Do conditions exist which hamper the development of the levels of 'trust' which aze
needed to generate the transactions that ensure the cooperation in the absence of which no
'gains from trade' can arise?
- Are there structural conditions which, given Europe's position in the world context, cause
the actuality of the greedy economy?
In order to answer these questions cross-national and longitudinal analyses of both institutio-
nally mediated and market determined socio-economic distributive outcomes wil be set up,
designed to elucidate their relationships to exclusion, unemployment and integration.
Exceptional poverty will be analysed as an instance of social exclusion in contrast to the case
of exceptional wealth. We shall try to explain the income-distribution and analyse the
feedback of political, social and cultural developments, especially the impact of social
exclusion on the performance of the economy. lmportant in this context is the interaction
between local and national labour markets, and between the transnational and international
monetary systems. By doing this new causes of social exclusion might be identified.
The theoretical apparatus needed to answer these questions will be borrowed from sociologi-
cal, social-psychological and economic theories that highlight the behavioural consequences
of lack of trust and foresight. Theories dealing with imperfect information, for instance
resulting in moral hazard and adverse selection problems, will initially guide the research.
Among these theories about the díscretionary power of managers and its consequences will
receive special attention.
The model of the greedy economy is a consequence of restrictions on the pattern maintenance
of long-term economic orientation on productivity (loyalty, motivation). Restrictions on the
pattern maintenance aspect of economy aze related to motivations of economic actors which
erode economic-cultural resources. This finds expression in:
- a strong orientation on money and the pursuit of gain in the short-term;
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an exceptional increase of the income of topmanagers and a decrease of the income
(including benefits) of poor people;
a careless attitude towards nature and environment.
Monetary developments contribute to the actuality of the model of the greedy economy.
Important in this connection is the current institutional context of the monetary system which
is characterized by:
- overconsumption, an imbalance beween consumption and production;
- decreasing investment rate, saturation of investments;
- no fixed exchange rates and insufficient supervision of the money markets by the
monetary authorities;
- weak links between the financial capital used for speculative purposes, and capital that is
put to use for prosperity enhancing trade and for productive investments;
- short-term speculation.
A short term reaction to this financial uncertainty is flexibility of the labour market. In the
model of the greedy economy the turbulence in the financial market is passed on to the labour
market resulting in a sharper division between the poor and the rich people. We are especially
interested in the feedback effect of social exclusion on the social and economic performance
of the economy.
6.3.41dealtypical deviations from the optimal situation ofinterpenetration
In the optimal societal situation of interpenetration the relationships between the four
institutions -Economy, Polity, Community and Social-Cultural System- are strongly develo-
ped. There is specialization or differentiation. The institutions have the capacity to meet the
functional requisites of adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and pattern-maintenance. At
the same time integration is brought about by processes of communication and by exchanges
of inputs and outputs: e.g. mediated by the functioning of dense, horizontal networks and
reciprocity. Dynamics and controlling go hand in hand. The capacity to adapt to the environ-
ment is well-developed. The same can be said about the level of internal integration. Parsons
has referred to this type of social system as 'Society" (Parsons, 1977: 182). 'Society' is
therefore an idealizing, not-descriptive concept.





In the case of conflict the separate institutions are strong. The exchange-zones, however, are
weak. There is no communication between the actors and the result is conflict. There is no
basis for compromises.
In the societal type of adaptation the dynamic institutions, i.e. economy and polity, are
dominating the controlling institutions, the community and the social-cultural system.
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Dynamic prevail, directional stability is absent. The situation is characterized by flexible
market dynamics which suppresses justice and security. There is flexibility of employees, but
no flexibility for employees. In other words the time-sovereignty, which would allow the
employee a measure of freedom in the organization of herlhis working time, is missing.
(Elchardus 1996: 14).
With respect to the case of adaptation the judgment of Scott Lash is relevant: "The point I
want to argue here is that the ghetto has been emptied out of all these economic and social-
cultural institutions - of mazkets, labour mazkets, commodity mazkets and capital mazkets; of
the industrial branch plants of corporate hierarchies, of corporatist institutions such as trade
unions, of welfare institutions, and of regulation by the family ... Disorganized capitalism ...
brings what Wacquant has called the "hyperghetto", in which all these institutions disappeaz
from the ghetto. The result, and that is the basis of the constitution of the black underclass, is
a deficit of such institutional regulation" (Scott Lash 1994: 161-162).
A third type is the rigid system. Here the controlling institutions strongly prevail over the
dynamic institutions. This societal type is the reverse of the societal type of adaptation.
A last type is isolation. There is differentiation between the four institutions. But the actors do
not relate to each other. There aze no mutually supporting exchanges. So societal performance
is suboptimal.
6. 3. 5 Deviations from the perfect labour market
The perfect labour mazket combines flexibility with security; we refer to this combination as
flexsecurity. There are two main deviations from the perfect labour market:
the flexible labour market without controlling which implies the absence of security;
the rigid labour market without flexibility.
Characteristics of the flexible labour market without security are:
- a bad correspondence between human capital and technological resources, caused by
technological determinism and the dominance of occupational and labour mazket
education over general education;
- the prevalence in the employment contract of the interests of employers with respect to
each of the AGIL-aspects.
The characteristics of the rigid labour market are the opposite of the characteristics of the
flexible labour market without security. The interests of employees aze prevailing.
According to Parsons and Smelser (1956: 173-175) a systematic classification system of
market imperfections can be built in five steps.
The first step is to locate the place of the interchange zone of the market. Relevant here is
the interchange zone between economy and the social-cultural system.
The second step is the choice between the possibilities of the consumers' market or the
labour market as interchange-zone. Here the choice is the labour market.
The third step takes account ofthe aspects of adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and
pattern maintenance which govern the market transactions.
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In a fourth step we can establish which aspects are especially relevant for some markets,
and assign them their proper weight.
The last step bears upon direction in which the aspects of adaptation, goal-attainment,
integration and pattern maintenance gravitate: in the direction of the economy, the employers,
or in the direction of the social-cultural system, i.e. the employees.
We can utilize this strategy to redefine the perfect labour market and the three types of labour
markets, which aze mentioned in section four: the occupational markets, the internal firm-
bounded mazkets and the non specific open mazkets.
Parsons and Smelser employed three sub-types of the labour market (1956: 147-156) which
aze very similaz to the three types we referred to. They distinguish the following types:
- markets for labour services at a low level of technical competence and involving low
degree of organizational responsibility - non-specific open labour markets;
- mazkets for executive services - paztly occupational mazkets;
- markets for professional services - partly internal firm-bounded mazkets.
In the perfect labour market the goal-attainment aspect has a high weight. There is no specific
advantage for either the employer or the employee. Occupational mazkets aze structurally
similar to the perfect labour market. The aspects of goal-attainment and integration aze also
heavily weighted. Employees are relatively more interested in the integration aspect whereas
employers aze more interested in the adaptation aspect. Internal firm-bounded mazkets
especially emphasize the internal aspects of the employment contract: the aspects of integrati-
on and pattern-maintenance. The aspect of adaptation is only weakly emphasized. The
interests of employees are important for the goal-attainment aspect and interests of employers
for the adaptation-aspect. The non-specific open labour markets aze strongly tilted in the
direction of the interests of employers. The aspects of adaptation and goal-attainment are very
important here.
7. Application of the theory on the module Households and Working Time Flexibility.
7.1 Introduction
Our theoretical framevv~ork can be applied to and used for the three empirical modules of the
TRANSLAM-program. We, i.e. the Department of Sociology of Tilburg University, are
involved in two modules: Active Labour Market Policies, and Households and Working Time
Flexibility. In the current phase of the program the module Active Labour Market Policies
has not yet progressed up to the point that we have enough information about the countries
that we want to compare.
For the module Households and Working Time Flexibility we have at our disposal the
concept-reports for seven countries. In this section we shall try to apply the theory to this
module. Based on the materials in the reports we will attempt to give an account of the
developments in the seven countries in terms of our theoretical framework. Should this turn
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out to be possible, we will conclude that theoretical framework might be of use for the
module Households and Working Time Flexibility.
In her book 'Banking on Flexibiliry' Jacqueline O'Reilly has developed an integrated societal
and gendered approach to cross-national employment research. The key factors, which
influence employers policy, are summarized in scheme 12 (Jacqueline O'Reilly, 1994: 260).
system of industrial relations
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Scheme 12: An integrated societa] and gerrdered approach to
cross-national employment
research
Source: Jacqueline O'Reilly (1994). Banking on Flexibiliry. A
comparison of flexible
employment in retail banking in Britain and France. Aldershot -
Brookfield USA - Hong
Kong - Singapore - Sydney: Avebury, 1994: 260.
In scheme 12 employers and firms have been assigned the central
position. Factors outside
the firm influence the actions of employers and firms. There is
always two-way relationship.
There are important relationships between seven outside factors and
employers and firms; the
outside factors also influence each other. In addition to the employers
and firms the main
factors are:
- the system of industrial relations and labour regulation;
- the education and training system;
- characteristics of labour;
- the systems of social welfare, tax and child care provision;
- the nature of state intervention;
- competition and technology.
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It is possible to integrate Jacqueline O'Reilly's scheme into our theoretical approach. All
variables appear in our institutional and figurational theory as well. See scheme 13.
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Social-cultural System of the
system - community
Schen:e 13: An Integrated Socio-Economic Approach for Cross-irational Employment
Research
Employers and firms are placed within the Economy. Within the Economy, more specifically
in the context of international competition, the technology mainly fulfills an adaptive
function. Developments within the Polity are designated by the nature of the state interventi-
on. The system of social welfare is an interchange zone between Economy and Polity. The
system of industrial relations and labour regulation are interchanges between Economy and
Community. We have mentioned the characteristics of available labour within the social-
cultural system. The education and training system is, together with the labour market and
consumption market, an interchange-zone between Economy and the Social-Cultural system.
The module Households and Working Time Flexibility is connected with the interchange
zone of the labour market. An important function of the Economy is adaptation to the
environment which implies flexibility. For the module Households and Working Time
Flexibility the first direct condition of the perfect labour market is particularly important.
Within the perfect labour market model this function appears in the adaptation function of the
labour contract. A balance must be struck between the interests of third parties to which
employers and employees relate. Employers and employees stand in a set of adaptive
relations to other units. The ability to function in other contexts must be preserved. Therefore
employers in the optimal situation prefer flexibility of working time, make optimal use of
human and technological capital and prefer to carry out their obligations to third parties:
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banks, consumers, sub-contractors etc. In the perfect labour mazket the flexibility of working
time is such, that the employees have secure jobs, sufficient income, enjoy a measure of
freedom, time sovereignty in order to take caze of domestic obligations, to combine paid work
and care activities, and to fulfill other roles. On the other hand, domestic requirements have to
be adjusted in order to enable the fulfillment of occupational obligations. The problem is to
strike a balance. The regulation of the demand of time for work is obviously one of the main
mechanisms which facilitates this balance' (Parsons and Smelser 1956: 115). The perfect
labour market combines flexibility with security: flexsecurity.
The boundary condition and the other three direct conditions of the perfect labour market are
not strongly connected with the theme Households and Working Time Flexibility. Which
does not mean that they are unimportant. Therefore we repeat:
- boundary condition: the necessity of a good combination of human and technological
resources due to a well functioning threefold system of 1) general, non-occupational
education, 2) intermediary zones of re-training and apprentice systems etc. and 3) internal
training within firms;
- the goal-attairunent condition of the labour contract: a balance between labour output,
.:productivity and wages and therefore a power balance between capital and labour;
- the integration condition: quality of work, good conditions of employment and quality of
labour services;
- the pattern maintenance condition: a balance of value pattem.
There are two deviations from the perfect labour mazket. The first deviation is
the flexible
]abour market without security. In this case employers have a power advantage.
Characteris-
tics of this type labour market are:
- the dominance of flexibility over security;
- a bad tuning of human capital and technological resources, caused by
technological
determinism;
- the dominance of occupational and labour market education over general
education;
- one sided flexibility of working time, without enough freedom from
work involvement to
adapt to certain household exigencies and to combine the work-role
with other roles;
a time buffer function of the housewife which allows the integration of
the time-frame-
works of labour, leisure, care work, education etc. within households;
- a low level of legal regulation of labour with regard to hours of
work, hiring and firing
practices, and weak social regulation regarding the combination of paid
work with care
work;
- no power balance between capital and labour, but one-sided power of
employers;
- bad quality of work, fringe benefits;
- low motivation of employees because of non-attractive jobs.
The second deviation from the perfect labour market is the rigid
labour market without
flexibility. In this case employees and labour unions occupy the stronger
power positions.
The characteristics of the rigid labour mazket without
flexibility aze the opposite of the
characteristics of the flexible labour market without security.
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In a number of steps the topic of'Households and Working Time Flexibility' can be built into
the systematic classification system of market imperfections:
1. We can locate the place of the interchange zone between economy and the social cultural
system;
2. The relevant market is the labour market;
3. In this step we take account of the aspects of adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and
pattern maintenance which govern the mazket transaction;
4. We can establish which aspects aze especially relevant for some labour mazket imperfecti-
ons and assign them a proper weight;
5. We indicate the direction in which the aspects of adaptation, goal-attainment, integration
and pattern maintenance are gravitating: toward the Economy, i.e. the employers or
toward social-cultural system, i.e. the employees.
We can also use the four deviating societal types of conflict, adaptation, rigid system and
isolation to characterize developments in the flexibility of working time.
It is more difficult to use our theories of the middle range: the supply, the demand, the
organization model and the model of the greedy economy. The use of these models requires
more information about interchanges at societal level. The concept reports on Households and
Working Time Flexibility did not contain such information. We shall use these models in
empirical analyses that bear upon the theoretical module on transitional labour mazkets and
employment systems.
Let us appl}~ now this theoretical framework to the concept reports on Households and
Working Time Flexibility. We shall first use the boundary condition and the four direct
conditions for the perfect labour market. Subsequently we will use the typology of societal
types.
ï.2 Application of our theoretical scheme to the module
ï.2. I Boundary condition and the four direct conditions for the perfect labour market
Boundary condition: a good combination of human resources andtechnological resources.
In the reports there are no remarks about this boundary condition for a perfect labour market.
Adaptation condition: a balance between the interests of third parties, connected with the
employer and employee.
In several reports we find remarks about this condition. There is a strong relationship between
the theme of 'Households and Working Time Flexibility' and the first condition of the perfect
labour mazket.
In the French report Jean-Yves Boulin, Michel Lallement, Gilbert Lefevre and Rachel Silvera
write the following. It could be advantageous to split the working hours of employees and the
operating hours of the material infrastructure (p. 8). Overtime in France, however, is a much
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used strategy. 'In 1991, overtime represented the equivalent of 680.000 full-time jobs' (p.8).
This use of overtime 'indicates above all a desire to control the labour force with the greatest
possible precision' (p. 14). In France we see no balance, but a prevalence in the employment
contract of the interests of employers.
In Germany we also see a lack of balance. The downward mobility of women reentering the
labour market 'is due to the fact that there is a limited number of secure part-time jobs, and
much of the part-time employment that is available is more precarious' (p.6). 'In terms of
child care there are practically no daycare facilities for children under 3... This makes it very
difficult for mothers with young children to combine care and paid employment', is the
comment of Jacqueline O'Reilly and Silke Bothfeld (p. 6). Here we see a clear example of a
deviation from the first direct condition of the perfect labour market.
In Ireland working time flexibility has received little support from trade unions, so write
Philip J. O'Connell and Fran McGinnity (p. 3). Perhaps the trade unions prefer the rigid
system that clearly does not represent the optimal situation of interpenetration. 'There is a fear
that they may be introduced unilaterally by management, and also that their introduction
would lead to reduced overtime earnings' (p. 3). Employers aze reluctant to encourage job
sharing opportunities (p. 4). The employers have won the struggle. 'Similazly, the increasing
preference of employers for temporary workers is seen as a trend towards increasing flexibili-
ty in the work place in order to increase capacity utilization, cuts costs and improve producti-
vity' (p. 7). Interests of employees, work security and justice, aze not fulfilled.
Because of the rigid system within the firms, the employers in Spain are not provided with
many tools for internal workforce adjustment, reports the Spanish TRANSLAM-team (p. 1).
'They use external workforce adjustment (generally dismissals) instead. Overtime is also
highly used in Spain, despite its cost. In fact, there has been a greater use of overtime in 1995
due to the economic recovery. Beside this, since fixed-term employment was liberalized in
1984, the proportion of fixed-term employment has surpassed 300~o and workers on these
contracts have suffered a great deal of the burden of workforce adjustment. Fixed-term
employment has been the Spanish tool for job-sharing, the way of filling the same jobs with
different people' (p. 2).
Mark Smith makes remarks about the situation in the United Kingdom, which we can relate
to the first condition of the perfect labour market. We see a clear deviation from this first
condition ever since 1993. 'Engineering agreement in the UK between the engineering unions
and employers' association was particularly influential in setting a benchmark for basic hours
and pressure for reduced basic working time. The agreement and centralized negotiations of
terms and conditions collapsed after pressure for working time reductions concentrated on the
largest firms and led to their departure from agreement' (p. l). 'No working time legislation
apart from restrictions for youth workers aged under 16 (hours and unsocial)' (p. 1). 'The UK
has the highest shaze of workers working more than 48 hours (the working time directive
limit)' (p. 1). 'There are some job sharing opportunities in the public sector but the take up is
generally low' (p. 2). 'High rates of unsocial hours working in the UK compazed to rests of
E12' (p. 3). 'Overtime: no statutory limits or regulations' (p. 4). 'Overtime is endemic in the
UK leading to the longest hours in Europe and the highest shares of workers doing more than
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48 hours' (p. 4). 'Collective agreements have not been particulazly good at protecting part-
timers except in the public sector' (p. 5). 'No statutory regulation specifically referring to part-
time employment' (p. 5). 'The UK vetoed the EC parental leave directive and the agreement
reached by the social partners will only apply to 14 member states due to the UK Maastricht
opt out' (p. 7). 'Poor employment protection in general in the UK means that it is not
necessary to use fixed term contracts to provide flexibility as workers can be dismissed easily'
(p. 10).
In The Netherlands we discern something of a trend in the direction of the first condition of
the perfect labour mazket. 'Despite this perception, in 1982 the social partners approved an
agreement, setting out more decentralized and flexible working relations. Based on the
principle that co-operation was necessary to increase the profitability of firms, and with a
view to promoting employment growth, this agreement provided for wage moderation in
exchange for a reduction in working time. It was also agreed that responsibility for employ-
ment conditions would be fully decentralized and entrusted to collective bazgaining on a
sectoral and company level', so say Harry Zanders and Claudia Koerhuis (p. 3). We suppose,
however, that Sweden more closely approaches the first condition of the perfect labour
market than does The Netherlands.
In Sweden we see a situation, in which the first direct condition of the perfect labour market
is more fulfilled than in France, Germany, Ireland, the UK and perhaps also The Netherlands.
'One salient feature of working time policy during this period was the creation of conditions
for greater flexibility in individual working time over the life cycle while preserving firms
competitiveness', so write Dominique Anxo and Donald Storrie (p. 3). They add remarks,
which are in congruence with the theory of the perfect labour market: communication and
negotiation against a background of trust aze necessary for the condition of interpenetration in
the perfect labour mazket. 'Such a policy could not succeed without a broad and active
cooperation between the social partners. This move to a negotiated flexibiliry as part of an
economic policy which rejects social exclusion and employment insecurity has been one of
the focal points of working time policy in Sweden' (p.3). 'As for as Sweden is concerned, it is
the combination of institutional and societal aspect such as a permissive legal framework for
leave of absence and the decentralisation of the decision making process concerning working
time which insure smooth working transitions during life cycle' (p. 8). 'Actually, part-time
work in Sweden constitutes along with the various forms of legal absenteeism, a means to
regulate and combine household activities and market work and promote a more equal gender
division of labour' (p. 12). 'To sum up, we may conclude that the Swedish taxation system,
the parental and study leave system and to a lesser extent the rise in child-caze has not only
accelerated female labour force growth and secured the position of women in the labour
market but has also constituted a policy instrument to increase individual working time
flexibility over the life cycle and facilitated smooth transitions between household activities,
training and the labour mazket. In Sweden, statutory leave of absence combined with the
scope for individualizing working time over the life cycle is therefore a means of promote
smooth transition and equal opportunities between gender' (p. 21).
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Goal-attainment condition: a balance between labour output, productiviry and wages and
therefore apower balance between capital and labour.
In the reports on Germany, The Netherlands and Spain there aze no remazks about this second
condition for the perfect labour market.
In France there is no power balance. 'While historically, the initiative for changes in the
regulation of working hours has always been that of the unions, the employers aze now in
driving the process' (p. 6).
In Ireland we also see a disbalance of power. 'Overtime working, in pazticulaz, remains a
popular way of accommodating fluctuations in demand, for both employers and employees in
Ireland' (p. 4). Employment levels are being not constrained by labour legislation. 'The report
went on to indicate that, in general, labour costs were of greater concern to enterprises, both
in regard to actual wages and associated costs such as PRST payments' (p. 5). Lack of market
for extra production is a reason not to expand employment (p. 5).
In particular in the United Kingdom we see a deviation from the second condition of the
perfect labour market: there is no power balance between capital and labour. 'Low levels of
pay in many low status occupations encourage many people to work long hours as a matter of
necessity while in higher paid occupations, such as professionals and managerial workers,
many be caught up in the culture of long hours. The lack of regulation and limits on working
time makes overtime a very populaz tool to provide employers with flexibility leading to long
hours', so writes Mark Smith (p. 1). 'Low pay acts as a disincentive for working time
reduction and working shorter hours without another source of income. A minimum wage in
the UK may reduce very long hours in some azeas of employment' (p. 2). 'Part-timers earning
UK f61 or less than a week are excluded from national insurance contributions (NIC) and
therefore the non-means-tested unemployment benefit' (p. 5). 'Sort-time work. To avoid
redundancy where it can be agreed but the low levels of pay may act as a disincentive' (p. 11).
Sweden is closer to a power balance. 'The Swedish tax policy has also contributed to the
sharp increase in female participation. The shift in Sweden in 1972 from family-based to
individual income taxation treatment has encouraged the labour force entry of wives' (p. 17).
Integration condition: qualiry of work, good conditions of employment and qualiry of labour
output.
In the reports there are few remazks about this third condition of the perfect labour market.
'Since 1982, it can be seen that the greatest contribution to the creation of new jobs has been
made by part-time employment. This form of employment applies mainly to the less qualified
type of worker, and it is most commonly applied to female workers' (French report: p. 13).
The situation for women in France can be negative regarding the quality of life. 'These two
characteristics, namely continuous working and a lower part-time rate, aze indicative of a
model of the "cumulative" type ( a full-time professional life and a family life) which
corresponds well to the French situation' (p. 15).
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This situation in France contrasts with the situation in Germany. 'Ostner (1993) argues that
social policy in Germany has tended to encourage women, especially in the West, to
withdraw from the labour market after childbirth and re-enter at a later stage' (p. 5). 'Maier et
al. (1994) argue that the downward mobility that German women experience on re-entering
the labour market is due to the fact that there is a limited number of secure part-time jobs, and
much of the part-time employment that is available is more precarious' (p. 6).
Mark Smith makes the following observation about the situation in the UK. 'As a result of the
concentration of part-timers in low level occupations transitions from full-time to part-time
employment can involve a move to lower status occupations' (p. 6).
Dominique Anxo contrasts Sweden with other Western countries. 'The nature of part-time
work seems very different in Sweden than in other industrial countries. While in Sweden
there are substantial legal opportunities to change working time over the life cycle, part-time
work in several countries in Europe is frequently synonymous of job insecurity. In contrast to
Sweden, the growth of part-time work in Europe occurred against the background of high
unemployment where women have been subject to employers short-term employment
adjustment. Hence, part-time is often concentrated in sectors with high employment rotation
and short-term contracts. On the other hand, in Sweden, the incidence of involuntary part-
time has been low and the possibility to shift from part-time to full-time work seems not to
present major difficulties. Part-time work in Sweden may be considered more as an historical
transition from married women inactivity towards a strategy, largely initiated by the govern-
ment, to strengthen female labour market commitments' (p. 11-12).
Fourth condition: a balance of value pattern.
In the reports we find little information about this fourth condition of the perfect labour
market.
7.2.2 Idealrypical deviationsfrom the optimal situation of interpenetration
We can also use the typology of societal types: conflict, isolation, adaptation, the rigid system
and the reference-type of interpenetration.
The societal rype of conflict.
In Europe it has frequently been the case that the societal type of conflict produced social
change. It is only in the French report that we find a remark. 'During the first half of the
twentieth century, social conflict got into its stride, and became the genuine engine of social
change' (French report, p. 3).
The societal rype of isolation.
With regard to the societal type of isolation the reports do not contain many indications. More
information is provided about the actuality of both the rigid system and the societal type of
adaptation.
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The societal type of the rigid system.
The reports mention indications of the actuality of the rigid system during the sixties, the
seventies and the beginning of the eighties. In the beginning of the eighties there is a reaction
to this rigid system. It is striking that the reaction to the rigid system takes place in several
countries at about the same time. What is the cause of this conspicuous fact? Could it be a
consequence of the oil-crisis? Perhaps the reaction has outlived itself, and aze we now
observing the rise to prominence of the societal type of adaptation becomes actual.
We will first give examples of the rigid system. In the rigid system the controlling institutions
prevail over the dynamic institutions. 'In order to promote a policy of work sharing, successi-
ve socialist governments added a series of arrangements aiming at the reduction of working
hours at the company's level to the existing legislative frame. Some of these did not succeed.
This was the case for the so called "contracts of solidarity" in 1982, which were intended to
encourage firms to reduce working hours and to hire additional staff or at least to maintain
the
level of employment by offering them exemptions from certain social contributions and
premium....The overall results achieved were disappointing on the whole, and from 1984
the
tone of the discourse altered. In a context of continuously increasing unemployment,
any
improvement in the employment situation was seen to depend on an improvement in
the
competitiveness of companies, to be acquired through greater flexibility' (French report, p. 4-
5).
'During the 1980's demands for a reduction in working time to a 35 hour
week were made
under conditions of relative prosperity and economic stability. Within
trade union, leftist and
academic circles there was also a discussion about promoting greater time
sovereignty, where
people had more autonomy to choose the working hours which suited them' (
German report,
p. 2). 'The Bismarckian system upheld difference in opposition to
general levelling, or
equality principle, associated with universal citizenship' (p. 5). 'The social
welfare system
which is largely based on the Bismarckian insurance principle clearly distinguishes
between
insiders (contributions) and outsiders (non-contributors)' (p. 8).
'Historically the social welfare system has not been conducive to flexible working
arrang-
ements, although recent changes have reduced some of the disincentives
to flexibility
inherent in the system' (Irish report, p. 9).
Very interesting, informative and indicative for the rigid system are
the remazks in the
Spanish report. 'Our industrialization process was promoted with public funds
(through the
INI, or National Institute of Industry) during the Franco dictatorship in the sixties.
This had a
strong influence on the peculiar national economic culture, whose main features aze the
little
managerial spirit, the low managerial modernity and the lack of firm labour
unions' (Spanish
report, p. 2). 'On the whole, we can say that the debate on working time flexibility
is still very
recent. It has to do with the handicap of the short Spanish experience in collective
bargaining
and social dialogue, beside the specific troublesome features of our labour
mazket (rigidity,
low ability of creation of employment)' (p. 4).
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'In the 1980's, the left-wing political parties and the trade unions were more concerned with
the preservation of the merits of the welfare state than with promoting flexibility. Their
perception was that the experience of flexibility in the United States had produced negative
results' (Dutch report, p. 3).
In Sweden we see little evidence for the existence of a rigid system in the past. 'While
working time has been a key component of Swedish welfare policy, governments and the
social partners have consistently refused to consider an across-the boazd reduction of working
time as an effective means of combatting unemployment' (Swedish report, p. 3).
The societal type ofAdaptation.
In the societal type of adaptation the dynamic institutions, the economy and the polity,
dominate the controlling institutions, the community and the social-cultural system. Dyna-
mics prevail. The situation is characterized the dynamics of flexible markets, which suppress
job-security and justice. In the eighties and nineties we see examples of the societal type of
adaptation in Western Europe.
'The greatest change, however, was the delegation of authority to branch level to negotiate
more flexible schemes for the organization of working hours' (French report, p. 4). 'The
overall results achieved were disappointing on the whole, and from 1984 the tone of the
discourse altered. In a context of continuously increasing unemployment, any improvement in
the employment situation was seen to depend on an improvement in the competitiveness of
companies, to be acquired through greater flexibility' (p. 5). 'These original measures are
aimed, not at sharing the available working hours, but at making this use more flexible' (p.5).
'To the end of the 1980's and early 1990's greater emphasis has been given to improving
working time flexibility within a context of growing international competition and increased
difficulties in the labour market, which are also associated with the reunification process'
(German report, p. 3). 'The gender specific nature of labour mazket transitions can also be
seen for example in the take up of short-time and part-time work: the former tends to be
found in traditional, trade union and male dominated industries, whereas part-time work is
seen as a preserve of women' (p. 5).
'The labour market in Ireland has become increasingly regulated in recent years with the
result that the Irish labour mazket institutions have moved closer toward the continental
European model of labour market regulation and away from the voluntarism it inherited from
the British tradition. Nonetheless a survey of employers conducted for the then Department of
Labour in 1986 did not suggest that employment levels aze being constrained by labour
legislation' (Irish report, p. 5). 'Similazly, the increasing preference of employers for
temporary workers is seen as a trend towards increasing flexibility in the work place in order
to increase capacity utilization, cut costs and improve productivity. This trend is particulazly
evident in the services sector' (p. 7).
Particularly in the UK we see a trend towards the societal type of adaptation. We base this
diagnosis on the remarks of Mark Smith that were cited when we discussed the adaptation
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condition and the goal-attainment condition of the perfect labour market. Here we add the
following remark of Mazk Smith. 'The structure of the national insurance system acts as an
incentive for employers to make low paid part-time jobs to avoid paying contributions.
Making low paid full-time jobs into part-time jobs can save employers a considerable amount
of money' (p. 5).
In The Netherlands, in the late nineties, we also observe clear indications for the actuality
of
the societal type of adaptation. 'In the late 1980's the Dutch government assigned primary
responsibility for policy on working conditions, including labour market flexibility, to the
social partners. The current government favours more flexibility of the labour mazket
and
calls for an enhanced role by the social partners' (p. 3). 'Flexibility in general is advocated
as
a means for enhancing the competitiveness of the economy and the cost-effectiveness of
firms. Flexibility is called for at both company and labour market levels. Freedom
of
contracts, decentralisation and deregulation aze key-words for the employers' (p. 4).
'An
explanation of the growing number of part-time workers in The Netherlands can be found by
the degree of coverage by labour law regulations. The Netherlands had low coverage
and a
high proportion of pazt-time work. Combined with a tax policy that exempts low income from
tax payments and a low degree of child-care provisions and a growing employment
rate of
women, Dutch employers seem to employ female part-time workers in the most flexible
and
cost-effective way' (p. 21). 'Employers have stressed the need for more flexible arrangements,
such as: 'on-call'-contracts, minimum-maximum contracts and zero-hours-contracts.
This
means an uncertain situation for employees. They are dependent on their employer when and
how much they can work and those involved have little legal protection' (p. 22).
The situation in Spain is not so clear. On the one hand, Spain has a rigid system. See the
remarks under 'The rigid system'. Internal workforce adjustment is difficult. Overtime
is very
frequent in Spain. The firing costs for permanent employment contracts are high (Spanish
report, p. 2). Adaptation takes place on the external labour market thanks fixed-term employ-
ment. 'Beside this, since fixed-term employment was liberalized in 1984, the proportion
of
fixed-term employment has surpassed 300~o and workers on these contracts have suffered a
great deal ofthe burden of workforce adjustment' (p. 2).
For Sweden there is little evidence for the actuality of the societal type of adaptation. Only
one remazk of Dominique Anxo and Donald Storrie hints in this direction. 'Thus, the
individual flexibility of the generous leave azrangements also provides flexible employment
forms for the employer and leads to insecure employment contracts for the leave replacement
employees' (p. 30).
The conclusion of this section is that our theoretical framework can be useful in the study of
Households and Working Time Flexibility. In some countries, in particulaz Sweden, The
Netherlands, Germany, and France there aze indications of developments in the direction of
interpenetration. However, we close with a remazk made by Jacqueline O'Reilly and Silke
Bothfeld. 'A key issue in German industrial relations at present revolves around the extent to
which this model of co-determination can be maintained under increasing economic pressures
coming both from home and abroad' (p. 4).
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8. Some concluding remarks
In this paper we have tried to broaden Schmid's theoretical conception of ihe transitional
labour market. The goal was to propose a more comprehensive theoretical framework that,
conceived as a formal model, may sensitize researchers to possibly relevant factors, actors
and processes.
We have used a neo-functionalist theory as the organizing guideline. The main reasons for
this choice are its comprehensiveness and the fact that it provides us with a conception of
equilibrium.
By linking the chosen framework to Boudon's explanatory scheme we have suggested a way
to connect the abstract concepts of the general model to causally interpretable observables
which are organized in terms of simplified models.
In the section discussing some middle range theories about deviations from the optimal
societal situation we proposed a number of more specific research themes that will be
addressed in subsequent research. We also made some suggestions as to which theories might
be usefully applied in the analysis of deviating situations.
Section 7 offers an application of the theory to the problems which are studied in the module
Households and Working Time Flexibility'.
' The authors are members of the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University, The
Netherlands.
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Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands,
fax t3113 466 2370, E-mail J.A.M.vWezel~a kub.nl or F.T.S.Kerstholt~a kub.nl
46
9. Literature
Akerlof, G. and J. Yellen (1990), E~ciency Wage Models of the Labor Market. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Akerlof, G. and J. Yellen (1990), The fair wage hypothesis and unemployment, The Quarter-
ly Journalof Economics, Vol. CV, May 1990, 2: 255-283
Altmann, N. 8z G. Bechtle 1971. Betriebliche Herschaftsstruktur und industrielle Ge-
sellschaft. Miinchen.
Baethge, M. u.a. 1975. Produktion und Qualifikation. Hannover.
Becker, G. 1964. Human Capital. Chicago.
Bolle, M. (Hrsg.) 1976. Arbeitsmarkttheorie und Aróeitsmarktpolitik. Opladen.
Boudon, R. 1981. The logic of social action. An introduction to sociological analysis.
London: Routledge 8c Kegan Paul
Boudon, R. 1986. Theories ofsocial change. Cambridge: Polity Press
Boudon, R. 1987. The individualistic tradit'ion in sociology, in: Alexander J. a.o (editors). The
micro- macro link. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 45-70
Bremer, W. 1991. Theorieën over de arbeidsmarkt en arbeidsmarktgedrag
in de bouw.
Groningen: Wolters~Noordhoff.
Brinton, M. 1993. Women and the economic miracle: gender and work in
postwar Japan.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Doeringer, P. 8z M. Piore 1971. Internal labor markets and manpower analysis.
Lexington.
Dunlop, J.T. 1958. Industrial relation systems. New York.
Edwards, R., M. Reich and G. Gordon 1975. Labor Market Segmentation. Lexington.
Eggertsson, T., 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge
Universi-
ty Press
Elchardus, Mark 1996. De gemobiliseerde samenleving. Tussen de oude
en de nieuwe
ordening van de tijd. Brussel: Koning Boudewijnstichting.
Europese Commissie 1994. Groei, concurrentievermogen,
werkgelegenheid. Naar de 21e




Fiske, A. 1991. The Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human
Relations. New York: The Free Press.
France: J. Boulin, M. Lallement, G. Lefevre, R. Silvera (1996): The institutional methods of
regulating working hours in France since the beginning of the eighties;
Galan, C. de l 981. Economie van de Arbeid.
Germany: Jacqueline O'Reilly and Silke Bothfeld (1996): Working time transitions and
Households in Germany;
Glebbeek, Arie C. 1993. Perspectieven op loopbanen. Groningen: Wolters~Noordhoff.
Groenewegen, J., F. Kerstholt and A. Nagelkerke. 1995. On Integrating New and Old
Institutionalism: Douglass North Building Bridges, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. XXIX,
No 2, June, pp. 467-475
Havekes, M.J.T.H. 1993. Socio-economic Development and Policy-making in Europe.
WORC paper 93.01.003I1. Tilburg: Tilburg University, WORC.
Hoof, J. van and J. Dronkers 1980. Onderwijs en Arbeidsmarkt. Een verkenning van de
relaties tussen onderwijs, arbeidsmarkt en arbeidssysteem. Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus.
Hoof, J. van 1990. De aansluiting tussen onderwijs en azbeid als beleidstenein. In: Open
Universiteit 1990. Cursus Arbeid en Samenleving. Arbeidspsychologie en -sociologie 2. Deel
2: Technologie, onderwijs en arbeid. Heerlen: Open Universiteit, pp. 109-125.
Hoof, J. van 1986. Interfaces en tussenschakels, twee benaderingen van de aansluiting tussen
onderwijs en arbeid. In: Tijdschrift voorArbeidsvraagstukken, 1986, 2, pp. 15-28.
Ireland: Philip J. O'Connell and Fran McGinnity (1996): Transitional Labour Markets:
Working Time Flexibility in Ireland;
Jenssen, A.T. 1995. Interpersonal values and the new political issues. In: Sociale Weten-
schappen, 38e jaargang, 1995, nummer 4, pp. 54-84.
Kerr, C1. 1982. The Balkanization of labor markets. In: L. Reynolds (Ed) 1982. Labor
economics and labor relations. New York: Englewood Cliffs.
Kerstholt, F. 1994. Van een neoklassieke naaz een neo-institutionele benadering van histori-
sche economische groei: kreeg Douglass North de eerste Nobelprijs voor historische
sociologie?, Sociale Wetenschappen, 37, l,pp. 30-56
Knegt, R. (red.), P.F. van der Heijden, R.H. van het Kaar, J. Roebroek, E. Sol, A.C.J.M.
Wilthagen 1995. Instituties van de Arbeidsmarkt: een retrospectieve studie. Amsterdam:
Hugo Sinzheimer Instituut, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
48
Krueger A. and L. Summers 1987. Reflections on the Inter-Industry Wage Structure. In:
Kevin Lang and Jonathan Leonazd (eds.), Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets,
OxfordlNew York, pp. 17-47
Lash, Scott 1994. The making of an underclass: neo-liberalism versus corporatism. In: Philip
Brown 8z Rosemary Crompton Ed 1994. A New Europe? Economic Restructuring and Social
Exclusion. London: UCL Press, pp. 157-174.
Lulofs, J. 1960. De Amerikaanse arbeidsmarkt.
Lutz, B. 8z W. Sengenberger 1974. Arbeitsmarktstrukturen und óffentliche Arbeitsmarktpo-
litik. Góttingen.
Mendius, H.G. u.a. 1976. Betrieb-Arbeitsmarkt-Qualifikation. Frankfurt.
Mickler, O. u.a. 1975. Zum Verháltnis von technischem Wandel und Sozialfassung. Gtitting-
en.
Mouzelis Nicos 1995. Sociological Theory. What went wrong? Diagnosis and Remedies.
London and New York: Routledge.
Munch, Richard 1982. Theorie des Handelns. Zur Rekonstruktion der Beitráge von Talcott
Parsons, Emile Durkheim und Maz Weber. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Munch, Richazd 1984. Die Struktur der Moderne. Grundmuster und differentielle Gestaltung
des institutionellen Aufbaus der modernen Gesellschaften. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Verlag.
Munch, Richard 1991. Dialektik der Kommunikationsgesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag.
Netherlands: Harry Zanders and Claudia Koerhuis (1996). Transitional Labour Markets.
Transitions through working time flexibility. The Dutch situation.
O'Reilly, Jacqueline 1994. Banking on Flexibility. A comparison offlexible employment in
retail banking in Britain andFrance. Aldershot - Brookfield USA - Hong Kong - Singapore -
Sydney: Avebury.
Ouchi, William G. 1980. Mazkets, bureaucracies, and clans. In: Administrative Science
Quarterly, 25, 129-141.
Parsons, Talcott 1978. Action Theory andthe Human Condition. New York: The Free Press.
Pazsons, Talcott 1977. Equality and Inequality in Modern Society, or Social Stratification
Revisited. In: Talcott Pazsons 1977. Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory. New
York: The Free Press: pp. 321-380.
49
Parsons, Talcott and Neil J. Smelser 1956. Economy and Sociery. A Study in the Integration
of Economic and Social Theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul LTD.
Pfriem, H. 1979. Konkurrierende Arbeitsmarkttheorien. Frankfurt.
Putnam, R. 1993. Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Rawski, T. et al. 199b. Economics and the Historian, Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Reynolds, L. (Ed.) 1956, 1982. Labor economics and labor relations. New York: Englewood
Cliffs.
Reynolds, L. 1951. The structure of labor markets. New York.
Schmid, Gunther 1993. Equality and Efficiency in the Labor Market. Towards a Socio-
Economic Theory of Cooperation in the Globalizing Economy. In: The Journal of Socio-
Economics, volume 22, number l, 31-67.
Schmid, Gunther 1996. Social Integration by Transitional Labour Markets. Notes on New
Pathwaysfor Labour Market Policy. Berlin: WZB.
Schmid, G. 1994. Equality and Efficiency in the Labour Market. Towards a Socio-Economic
Theory of Cooperation. In: Gunther Schmid (ed.) Labor market institutions in Europe.
Armonk NY and London: M.E. Sharpe
Schouten, D., 1980. Macht en Wanorde: een vergelijking van economische stelsels, Ley-
den~Antwerpen: Stenfert Kroese.
Schwartz, S. 1994. Cultural Differences across Nations: A Values Perspective. Tilburg:
WORC-paper.
Semmler, W. and J. Hoffmann 1972. Kapitalakkumulation, Staatseingriffe und Lohnbewe-
gung. Berlin.
Sengenberger, W. 1975. Arbeitsmarktstruktur. Frankfurt.
Spain: Spanish TRANSLAM team ( 1996). Transitional Labour Markets. Transitions through
working time flexibiliry in Spain. The Spanish situation.
Streeck, W. and P.C. Schmitter 1985. Community, Mazket, State, - and Associations? The
Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order. In: European Sociological
Review, 1, 119-138.
Swedberg, R. 1991. Schumpeter: a biography. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press
50
Sweden: Dominique Anxo and Donald Storrie (1996). Working time transitions in Su~eden.
Thompson, Grahame 1993. Comparison between models. Introduction. In: Grahame
Thompson, Jennifer Frances, Rosalind Levacic, Jeremy Mitchell, (Ed) 1993. Markets,
Hierarchies andNetworks. London: Sage Publications, p. 244.
Thurow, L. 1975. Generating Inegualiry. New York.
Triandis, H.C. 1994. Horizontal and vertical Individualism and Collectivism and Work
Tilburg: WORC-paper.
United Kingdom: Mazk Smith (1996). Institutional Tables and Figures for the United
Kingdom.
Voorden, W. van 1975. Institutionalisering en arbeidsmarktbeleid. Alphen aan
de Rijn.
Wezel, J. van and M. Havekes 1995. Economie en Samenleving. Een
internationaal-vergelij-
kende studie van het arbeidsbestel. Utrecht: Lemma Uitgeverij.
Wezel, J. van 1992. Conceptuele dilemma's in socio-economie. Socio-economie
en co~rdina-
tiepatronen. WORC paper 92.11.012~1. Tilburg: Tilburg University,
WORC.
Wezel, J.A.M. van and H.M. Kuperus 1990. Cursus Arbeid en Samenleving.
Arbeidspsy-
chologie en -sociologie 2. Deel 4. Arbeid en samenleving in model: een
integratiekader.
Heerlen: Open Universiteit.
Wezel, J. van 1994. Conceptuele dilemma's in socio-economie. Socio-economie,
ideaalty-
pische co~rdinatiepatronen en mengvormen. In: Sociale Wetenschappen,
37e jaargang,
nummer 1, 57-72.
Wezel, J. A.M. van 1979. Sociale ongelijkheid en arbeidsverdeling.
Een kritiek op het
huidige beleid ter bestrijding van knelpunten op de arbeidsmarkt. Inaugurele
rede. Tilburg:
Katholieke Hogeschool.
Williamson, Oliver E. 1981. The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Appro-
ach. In: American Journalof Sociology, 87, number 3, 548-577.
Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. Credible commitments: using hostages to support exchange,
In:
American Economic Reviex~, 73, (september), 519-549
~ ~i h N~iwww iiiui~uí~ni
Work and Organization Research Centre
Warandelaan 2, P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Phone -~31 13 4663140
Fax f31 13 4662053
